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THE  NEED  OF 

AUTOMATIC  TRAIN 

CONTROL 


With  Facts 

Concerning  Its  'Development 
and  Present  Status 


By   W.  M.  CAMP 
Editor,  Railway  Review 


THE  RAILWAY  REVIEW  CO. 
CHICAGO 

1920 


GIFT   ©F 


Page 
Train  Accidents,  in  General  ...................  _  ......................     7 

Train  Dispatching  System  —  .....  ..  ..................  —  ......    8 

Principles  of  Block  Signaling  .............  ______  .............  „  10 

Controlled-Manual  Block  ................................................  1  1 

Track-Circuit-Controlled  Block  .................................  1  1 

Statistics  on  Collision  Accidents  .......  ..  ........................  13 

Necessity  for  Derails  with  Interlockings  ............  13 

Necessity  of  Flagging,  with  Block  Signals  .........  14 

How  Mistakes  Occur  ............................................................  18 

Weather  Conditions  ___________  ............  ~  ..............  ~  ...................  18 

Mental  Conditions  ................................  ____  ............................  19 

Enginemen  Falling  Dead  on  Duty  ...........................  21 

Collision  Accidents  ..................................................................  23 

Atlantic  City,  on  P.  &  R.  Ry._  .................................  14 

Oakland,  Cal.,  on  S.  P.  Co.  Ry  .................................  14 

On  Mobile  &  Ohio  R.  R  ........................  .  ..................  _  21 

On  Lehigh  Valley  R.  R  ...................................................  22 

Terra  Cotta,  on  B.  &  O.  R.  R  ............  -  .................  .  23 

Fowler,  on  Big  Four  Ry  ...............................................  24 

Westport,  on  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R  ................  25 

Bridgeport,  on  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R  ............  25 

Wallingford,  on  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R  .........  26 

Amherst,  on  N.  Y.  Central  R.  R  ____________  ...........  26 

Mt.  Union,  on  P.  R.  R  .............  M  .......................................  29 

Earlville,  on  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R  ....................................  30 

Ivanhoe,  on  Mich.  Cent.  R.  R  ....................  ..  ..............  31 

South  Byron,  on  N.  Y.  Central  R.  R  ............  .....  32 

Fort  Washington,  on  P.  &  R.  Ry_  ........  _____  .......  32 

Elmwood,  on  P.  R.  R  ......................................................  32 

3 

5^7-464 


Page 


Inadequacy  of  Discipline  ...................................................  35 

Conditions  on  English  Railways  ........................  36,  52 

Progress  with  Automatic  Train  Control  ............  39 

Government  Investigations  .............................................  41 

Block  Signal  and  Train  Control  Board.  .......  42,  60 

Automatic  Train  Control  Committee  .....................  45 

Installations  — 

Rowell-Potter  System  _  .................  -  ....................  ..  .....  42 

Kinsman  System  .........................................................  50,  54 

Julian-Beggs  System  ....................  ..  ...............................  52 

American  Train  Control  System  ...........................  54 

Miller  Automatic  Stop  System...  ..........................  52 

Casale  Safety  Device  System  .................................  56 

Elementary  Problems  ............................................................  46 

Use  of  the  Overlap  ..................................................................  46 

Speed  Control  ..............................................................................  47 

"Permissive"  Running  ......................................................  49 

Lines  of  Development  .......................  .................................  51 

Cab  Signals  ....................................................................................  5  1 

Automatic  Stops,  New  York  Subways  .........  50,  54 

Automatic  Stops,  Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  R  ...............  52 

Automatic  Stops,  Chesapeake  &  Ohio  R.  R  ......  54 

Types  of  Apparatus  ...............................................................  53 

Requisites  of  Installation  ..................  _  ................  ..  ...........  57 

A  General  View  ......................................  ....................................  58 

Cost  of  Installation  ..................................................................  62 

P-41 


For  more  than  twenty  years  past  it  has  been 
the  editorial  policy  of  the  Railway  Review  to 
encourage  the  use  of  the  automatic  train  stop, 
as  a  necessary  supplement  to  the  block-signal  sys- 
tem. In  this  way  it  has  fallen  to  the  writer  to 
study  the  possibilities  of  such  a  means  of  pro- 
moting the  safety  of  train  operation,  and  to  fol- 
low the  progress  of  the  development  of  it.  The 
ideas  and  facts  comprised  in  this  brief  treatise 
are  the  result  of  frequent  scrutiny  of  railroad 
accidents  and  the  circumstances  relating  there- 
to; and  essentially  all  of  these  have  been  ex- 
pressed, in  various  connections,  in  the  course 
of  my  editorial  work.  As  here  presented  they 
are  a  digest  of  matter  of  my  own  authorship 
which  has  appeared  in  the  Railway  Review, 
but  now  rewritten  and  arranged  in  connected 
form. 

Even  this  short  account  should  not  fail  to  pay 
tribute  to  the  industry,  the  intelligence  and  the 
perseverance  with  which  many  worthy  men  have 
labored  on  this  problem  of  the  automatic  con- 
trol of  trains.  Encountering  the  disinterested 
attitude  of  many  railway  officials,  in  the  early 
days,  and  not  a  little  prejudice,  they  had  a  hard 
row  to  hoe.  Some  of  the  most  efficient  of  these 
men  of  genius  are  now  dead  and  gone,  and  the 

5 


chapter  'of  >ailroaki' History  that  should  do  justice 
to  their  efforts  will  probably  never  be  written, 
adequately.  They  deserved  better  recognition, 
for  the  quality  of  their  work,  at  a  later  day,  and 
in  a  more  sympathetic  environment  would  no 
doubt  have  achieved  better  success.  But,  as  a 
rule,  one  inventor  builds  upon  the  work  of  an- 
other, and  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  the  labor 
of  many  in  this  field  who  were  destined  not  to 
see  the  finish,  has  not,  after  all,  been  entirely 
lost.  Such  is  the  story  of  civilization,  all 
through:  the  march  of  progress  is  often  over 
ground  well  trodden  by  those  who  have  gone 
long  before. 

The  cause  of  automatic  train  control  is  no 
longer  frowned  upon  nor  easily  dismissed  by 
those  charged  with  the  responsibility  of  railway 
operation.  The  practical  utility  and  the  availa- 
bility of  means  to  put  this  thing  into  being  have 
well  been  demonstrated.  The  fog  is  rising,  and 
the  imaginary  difficulties  that  have  so  long  stood 
in  the  way  of  progress  have  well-nigh  vanished. 
The  tune  has  changed  from  "it  can't  be  done" 
to  "wherewith  shall  we  get  the  money?"  That 
is  not  an  unanswerable  argument  with  American 
people — if  it  were,  this  question  of  automatic 
train  control  would  never  have  come  into  exist- 
ence, for,  to  begin  with,  we  would  never  have 
had  railroads. 

W.  M.  CAMP. 


RAILWAY  ACCIDENTS. 

The  accident  record  in  the  operation  of  our 
railroads  has  always  been  a  sad  reflection.  And 
while  there  is  no  other  modern  means  of  trans- 
portation without  some  fateful  compensations, 
there  has  long  been  a  conviction  in  the  public 
mind,  nevertheless,  that  more  safeguards  against 
accidents  on  railroads  were  reasonably  attain- 
able. Compared  with  European  standards, 
American  railroads  have,  in  some  respects,  been 
cheaply  constructed.  Very  commonly  they  cross 
public  highways  at  grade,  and  about  88  per  cent 
of  the  mileage  is  still  single  track.  The  former 
condition  is  a  prolific  source  of  accident  to  people 
on  the  highways,  and  the  latter  is  a  factor  of 
certain  hazards  of  train  operation,  more  re- 
markably so  with  increase  in  traffic  density.  In 
accordance  with  both  public  and  corporate  policy 
grade  highway  crossings  with  railroads  are  being 
gradually,  but  very  slowly,  eliminated,  at  much 
expense;  and  the  building  of  second  track,  the 
so-called  double-tracking  of  line,  is  proceeding  as 
rapidly  as  the  resources  of  the  railroad  com- 
panies will  permit.  The  progress  in  this  direc- 
tion also  has  been  very  slow,  particularly  during 
recent  years. 

The  phase  of  the  subject  here  discussed  has  to 
do  with  train  accidents,  and  with  certain  im- 
provements or  devices  which  can,  relatively 
speaking,  be  provided  at  moderate  cost,  to  pro- 
mote safety  of  operation  on  the  roads  as  they 

7 


stand,  single,  double  or  multiple  tracks,  and 
without  regard  to  future  progress  of  roadbed 
development. 

Train  accidents  are  mainly  of  two  kinds — de- 
railments and  collisions — and  the  casualties  of 
the  latter  far  exceed  those  of  the  former.  Adop- 
tion of  the  best  recognized  standards  of  con- 
struction for  track  and  rolling  equipment,  and 
proper  attention  to  inspection  and  maintenance 
of  the  same,  is  about  all  that  may  consistently  be 
expected  of  railway  managements  as  an  effort  to 
reduce  derailment  accidents  to  a  minimum.  As 
for  collisions,  however,  the  negligence  of  em- 
ployees and  their  liability  to  error  are  elements 
of  uncertainty  that  must  be  guarded  against. 

Of  the  two  classes  of  accidents,  collisions  are 
the  more  deplorable.  A  derailment  might  be 
caused  by  a  broken  wheel  or  journal,  a  washout, 
a  landslide  or  by  some  other  casualty  that  no 
amount  of  human  foresight  could  anticipate ;  but 
collisions  almost  always  occur  through  negli- 
gence or  error.  It  is  just  this  contingency  in  rail- 
road operation  that  mechanical  experts  have 
sought  to  overcome  by  ingeniously  contrived 
checks  and  warnings.  In  view  of  the  frequency 
of  preventable  train  accidents  it  is  therefore  per- 
tinent to  inquire  whether  precautionary  means 
have  been  carried  far  enough. 

Historically  speaking,  train  operation  in  this 
country  has  developed  on  or  from  the  time  table 
and  dispatching  system.  In  train  dispatching  the 
meeting  of  trains  on  single  track,  and  the  spacing 
of  following  trains,  or  the  passing  points  for  the 

8 


same,  on  either  single  or  double  track,  is  con- 
trolled by  written  orders.  At  points  distant  from 
the  headquarters  of  the  dispatcher  it  is  necessary 
to  convey  the  order  by  telegraph  or  telephone, 
necessitating  the  participation  of  three  or  more 
parties  in  the  issuance  and  receipt  of  the  written 
order,  namely  the  dispatcher,  the  telegraph  or 
telephone  operator  and  the  conductor  and  en- 
gineman  of  one  train  or  more.  Upon  receipt  of 
the  order  by  the  trainmen  they  proceed  to  carry 
out  the  intended  movement  unmindful  of  any 
contingencies  that  may  arise  through  error  or 
mistake  of  any  one  concerned.  Long  experience 
has  demonstrated  that  this  system  of  operation 
is  time  consuming,  it  results  in  delays  to  trains, 
and  it  has  frequently  led  to  collisions  through 
oversight  or  mistakes  of  the  dispatcher,  errors 
of  transmission,  misunderstanding  of  the  order 
by  the  trainmen,  or,  finally,  through  failure  of 
either  the  engineman  or  the  conductor  to  bear  in 
mind  and  obey  the  full  or  exact  meaning  of  the 
order.  Furthermore,  the  mere  issuance  of  run- 
ning orders,  even  when  correctly  transmitted 
and  interpreted,  does  not  afford  protection 
against  rear-end  collisions.  The  faulty  aspect 
of  a  system  that  is  liable  to  so  many  sources  of 
error  must  be  evident  in  any  study  of  train 
operation. 

Owing  to  the  aforementioned  shortcomings 
and  the  necessity  to  increase  track  capacity,  rail- 
roads have  been  working  away  from  the  dis- 
patching method,  to  a  large  extent,  by  substi- 
tuting the  block  system.  By  this  means  there  are 


manually-operated  or  automatic  wayside  signals 
at  the  entrance  of  designated  sections  of  the 
road,  called  "blocks,"  which  serve  to  inform  an 
engineman  whether  the  block  ahead  of  him  is 
clear  or  occupied.  At  interlocked  crossings  the 
block  section  radiates  over  all  tracks  to  a  safe 
distance  from  their  point  of  intersection,  and 
the  signals  determine  on  which  of  the  routes 
the  right  of  way  is  permitted.  By  the  block  sys- 
tem enginemen,  if  attentive  to  the  signals,  are 
kept  informed,  step  by  step,  as  it  were,  as  to 
conditions  a  safe  distance  ahead,  and  trains  fol- 
lowing at  speed  may  be  kept  at  proper  intervals, 
independently  of  special  orders.  Running  by 
block  signal  is,  therefore,  a  great  advance  over 
the  more  or  less  haphazard  movements  that  may 
take  place  under  the  latitude  and  the  chance  of 
error  of  the  dispatching  system  alone.  And  it 
may  here  be  noted  that  some  measure  of  the 
train-order  method  is  usually  retained  with 
block-signal  operation,  to  select  meeting  points 
with  extra  trains  or  with  delayed  trains,  or  to 
devise  run-arounds  for  trains  of  different  class 
in  the  same  current;  but,  on  double  or  multiple 
tracks,  trains  may,  with  timetable  and  block  sig- 
nals, be  operated  with  but  little,  if  any,  direction 
through  train  orders.  On  single  track,  also,  train 
dispatching  may  largely  be  dispensed  with 
through  the  installation  of  block  signals,  al- 
though the  services  of  operators  are  usually 
called  upon  for  arranging  head-on  meets  and 
run-arounds. 

During  the  past  thirty  years  block  signals  have 

10 


been  extensively  installed  on  American  railroads 
and  they  may  now  be  found  on  nearly  all  of  the 
heavy-traffic  lines  or  on  the  densely-operated  por- 
tions of  such  lines.  Block  signals  are  now  in 
service  on  more  than  100,000  miles  of  road,  of 
which  about  37,000  miles  is  protected  by  auto- 
matic block  signals. 

Controlled-Manual  Block. — To  protect  manual 
blocking  against  mistakes  of  the  signalmen  the 
levers  operating  the  block  signals  are  sometimes 
electrically  controlled  in  such  manner  that  the 
co-operation  of  the  operators  at  both  ends  of  the 
block  is  necessary  before  a  signal  can  be  cleared 
to  admit  a  train  to  the  block.  This  is  commonly 
known  as  controlled-manual  blocking,  or  "lock 
and  block."  As  the  operator  at  the  leaving  end 
should  have  knowledge  as  to  whether  or  not  a 
train  reported  in  the  block  has  passed  out  of  it, 
he  is  thus  in  position  to  check  the  operator  at  the 
entrance  end.  Still,  should  the  operator  at  the 
leaving  end  be  at  fault,  then  the  joint  action  of 
the  two  might  result  in  admitting  two  trains  to 
the  block. 

Track-Circuit  Control. — To  guard  against 
errors  of  the  men  at  both  ends  of  manually- 
operated  blocks  a  complete  and  positive  check 
may  be  had  by  the  use  of  a  track  circuit,  making 
it  impossible  for  either  to  clear  a  signal  govern- 
ing entrance  to  the  block  as  long  as  the  block  is 
occupied. 

As  for  automatic  block  signals  it  may  be  said 
that  they  have  been  perfected  to  such  a  degree 
that  their  operation  is  extremely  reliable.  It  is 

11 


the  first  principle  of  operation  of  these  devices 
that  the  signal  will  be  found  in  the  stop  position 
or  will  go  to  that  position,  in  event  of  derange- 
ment or  obstruction  of  the  apparatus  by  weather 
conditions  or  accident  of  any  sort.  Very  seldom 
or  almost  never  does  it  occur  that  a  signal  will 
"stick  to  clear"  or  be  found  giving  a  false  clear 
indication.  In  other  words,  the  failures  or  short- 
comings of  such  devices  are  practically  always 
on  the  side  of  safety,  and  the  worst  thing  that 
may  happen  will  be  the  stopping  of  a  train  un- 
necessarily. 

And  yet,  as  reliable  as  automatic  block  signals 
and  controlled-manual  block  may  be,  neither  is 
of  any  avail  unless  observed  and  obeyed  by  the 
enginemen;  for  some  of  the  worst  collision 
wrecks  that  have  occurred  in  this  country  have 
happened  because  the  engineman  either  did  not 
see  or  disregarded  a  signal  set  against  him. 
While  there  can  be  no  question  but  that  the 
equipment  of  the  busy  roads  with  block  signals 
has  greatly  reduced  the  chances  of  collision  acci- 
dents, yet  by  no  means  have  such  installations 
entirely  prevented  them.  Bad  collision  accidents 
do  happen  every  year  on  track  that  is  well 
equipped  with  block  signals,  and  through  no  fault 
of  the  signals. 

Statistics  proving  the  frequency  with  which 
enginemen  do  overrun  signals  are  surprising. 
The  latest  annual  report  of  the  Bureau  of  Safe- 
ty, Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  shows  that 
of  the  53  collision  accidents  that  were  investi- 
gated during  that  year  (1919),  no  less  than 

12 


eleven  were  caused  by  disregard  of  fixed  signals 
by  enginemen.  Beginning  with  the  year  1911, 
the  official  record  for  five  years  was  31  collisions, 
in  which  166  people  lost  their  lives,  caused  by 
the  failure  of  enginemen  to  observe  or  obey  the 
indications  of  fixed  signals.  At  the  end  of  seven 
years  the  record  showed  SO  collisions,  in  which 
270  persons  wrere  killed  and  1405  others  injured, 
where  the  primary  cause  was  the  disregard  of 
signal  indications;  and  at  the  end  of  the  eighth 
year  the  number  of  collisions  from  this  cause 
had  increased  to  61. 

Seemingly  such  accidents  fall  into  a  class 
which  modern  block  signaling  is  unable  to  pre- 
vent. The  Bureau  of  Safety,  in  its  reports  on 
such,  has  repeatedly  pointed  out  that  the  best 
system  of  signaling,  properly  installed  and  in 
perfect  working  order,  would  not  prevent  acci- 
dents; "that  employees  of  the  highest  class,  with 
long  records  for  faithful  performance  of  their 
every  duty,  have  failed  at  critical  times;"  and 
that  "there  is  some  weakness  in  our  system  of 
railroad  operation  that  has  not  been  overcome  by 
the  best  engineering  talent  of  to-day  or  by  care- 
ful selection  and  training  of  employees."  X" 

Necessity  for  Derails. — The  widespread  dis- 
trust of  wayside  signals  alone  as  adequate  pro- 
tection to  trains  in  all  situations  is  well  enough 
attested  in  the  general  use  of  derails  at  inter- 
locked crossings.  At  crossings  protected  by  in- 
terlocked signals  without  derails  there  have 
been  disasters,  and  there  has  been  frequent  de- 
railment of  trains  at  crossings  where  there  were 

13 


derails,  so  that  either  experience  proves  the 
case.  Near  Atlantic  City,  N.  J.,  on  July  30,  1896, 
at  a  crossing  of  the  Philadelphia  &  Reading  Ry. 
and  the  West  Jersey  &  Seashore  R.  R.,  two  pas- 
senger trains  collided,  killing  42  people  outright 
and  injuring  more  than  50  others,  several  of 
whom  died  afterwards.  In  this  case  the  inter- 
locked signals  were  properly  displayed  and  the 
accident  occurred  in  daytime  in  clear  weather. 
As  another  instance  (July  4,  1908),  two  South- 
ern Pacific  passenger  trains  collided  on  a  cross- 
ing in  Oakland,  Cal,  killing  six  people  and  injur- 
ing 30  others.  A  train  from  Alameda  struck  and 
cut  in  two  a  train  from  Santa  Cruz.  The  crossing 
was  an  interlocked  one,  without  derails,  and  the 
signal  stood  against  the  Santa  Cruz  train,  but 
the  engineman  did  not  observe  it.  In  almost 
countless  other  instances  the  "moral  effect"  of 
the  derail  has  not  been  realized,  and  trains,  with 
both  signals  and  derails  against  them,  have  been 
derailed,  often  with  serious  consequences.  When 
enginemen  will  disregard  an  interlocking  signal 
or  fail  of  timely  action  in  its  presence,  with  the 
certain  knowledge  that  a  derail  is  open  in  front 
of  them,  it  obviously  can  not  be  expected  that  the 
chances  for  proper  attention  to  block  signals  in 
all  cases  can  be  any  better. 

Necessity  of  Flagging,  with  Block  Signals. — 

The  universal  practice  in  this  country  of  requir- 
ing flagging,  as  an  additional  protection  to  trains 
in  block-signal  territory,  also  is  significant  of  the 
negligence  of  enginemen  in  observation  of  sig- 
nals. The  chance  of  enginemen  overrunning 

14 


block  signals  set  to  stop  is  too  great  to  dispense 
with  this  extra  means  of  precaution,  yet,  as  will 
be  seen,  collisions  have  occurred  where  not  only 
were  the  automatic  block  signals  working  per- 
fectly, but  flagging  also  was  properly  done. 
However,  the  reliability  of  flagmen,  as  a  class, 
is  no  better  than  that  of  enginemen,  if  even  as 
good,  for  instances  where  their  negligence  has 
resulted  in  disaster  are  almost  too  numerous  to 
mention.  Moreover,  an  engineman  who  would 
disregard  or  overrun  a  stop  signal  would  be 
equally  disposed  to  commit  the  same  error  in  the 
presence  of  a  flag  signal. 

So,  unfortunately,  this  means  of  protection, 
also,  is  not  to  be  depended  upon  in  all  cases,  as 
has  been  only  too  well  proven  by  the  results  of 
long  experience.  Some  discussion  of  the  contin- 
gencies that  may  arise  in  the  work  of  flagging, 
and  how  difficult  it  is  to  realize  obedience  to  the 
rules,  is  pertinent  to  this  question. 

Flagging,  or  the  use  of  hand  signals,  is  the 
oldest  method  of  protecting  trains  while  they  are 
stopped  on  main  track,  and,  as  stated,  it  is  still 
in  practically  universal  use  in  this  country,  where 
block  signals  are  in  service  as  well  as  on  roads 
where  they  do  not  exist.  The  proper  method  of 
protection  by  rear-end  flagging  is  a  simple  mat- 
ter. The  essential  thing  is  that  a  flagman  be  far 
enough  from  the  train  he  is  protecting  to  signal 
an  approaching  train  in  time  to  make  a  safe  stop. 
In  addition  to  flag  or  lantern  he  may  carry  tor- 
pedoes, to  make  audible  signals  in  case  of  bad 

15 


weather  or  inattention  on  the  part  of  the  engine- 
man  of  an  approaching  train,  or  he  may  carry 
and  use  fusees.  With  proper  vigilance  on  the  part 
of  a  flagman  a  train  can  hardly  get  past  him 
without  observation  of  a  signal,  of  one  kind  or 
another,  by  its  engineman. 

The  fact  that  many  collisions  have  taken  place 
where  no  flagman  was  present  or  where  the 
flagman  was  not  out  far  enough  to  protect  his 
train  seems  to  have  given  rise  to  an  impression, 
more  or  less  general,  that  flagging,  after  all,  is 
a  loose  method  of  train  proteetion;  and  such, 
indeed,  it  really  is  when  not  properly  done.  The 
cause  of  trouble  from  improper  flagging  usually 
has  been  that  the  flagman  either  did  not  go  far 
enough  back,  or  that  a  train  slipped  up  on  him 
before  he  had  time  to  get  back  a  proper  distance, 
or  while  he  was  running  to  catch  his  train  after 
being  called  in.  In  any  of  such  circumstances  the 
fault  lies  with  negligence  of  duty  and  not  with 
the  system  if  the  latter  be  guarded  with  proper 
regulations.  Protection  while  a  flagman  is  run- 
ning back  can  be  had  by  throwing  off  a  lighted 
fusee  while  the  train  is  slowing  down,  the  flag- 
man then  making  a  run  to  the  rear  as  soon  as 
his  train  stops.  Protection  while  running  to  the 
train,  after  being  called  in,  can  be  had  by  the 
use  of  either  fusee  or  torpedoes.  Torpedoes  are 
objectionable  in  many  instances  ,  as  they  may 
stop  trains  unnecessarily  a  long  time  after  the 
train  they  were  left  to  protect  has  departed,  but 
where  the  view  is  obstructed  to  the  rear  of  the 
train,  or  in  case  of  a  heavy  wind,  or  whenever  the 

16 


weather  conditions  are  bad,  as  in  storm  or  fog, 
either  torpedoes  or  fusees  should  be  used  to  pro- 
tect trains  while  the  flagman  is  running  in.  The 
alternative  is  for  the  train  to  proceed  without 
calling  in  its  flagman,  but  such  practice  also  re- 
sults in  stopping  the  following  train  unneces- 
sarily, in  most  cases,  and  as  it  leaves  the  train 
short  one  of  its  flagmen  it  is  evident  that  on 
repeated  stops  a  flagman  could  not  be  left  behind 
each  time. 

Unless  the  precautions  mentioned  be  taken,  the 
greatest  danger  from  following  trains  is  while 
flagmen  are  getting  out  or  returning  to  their 
trains,  and  right  here  is  where  negligence  is  most 
liable  to  occur.  It  is  just  as  negligent  for  a 
flagman  to  run  to  his  train  without  leaving  some 
signal  at  proper  flagging  distance  to  warn  an 
approaching  train  as  it  would  be  for  an  army  to 
draw  in  its  picket  lines  while  breaking  camp  and 
getting  ready  to  march.  The  question  of  safety 
in  flagging  is  not  at  all  one  as  to  whether  the 
train  to  be  protected  shall  proceed  without  calling 
in  its  flagman,  or  otherwise,  but  entirely  a  ques- 
tion as  to  whether  or  not  that  flagman  imme- 
diately goes  to  the  rear  a  safe  distance  as  soon 
as  his  train  stops,  and  takes  due  precaution  to 
protect  the  train  while  running  back  to  it  upon 
being  called  in.  The  only  consequence  of  such 
careful  practice  is  a  few  minutes  of  additional 
delay  to  the  train.  But  the  efficiency  and  re- 
liability of  this  method  of  train  protection,  as 
every  one  must  appreciate,  are  too  largely  a  ques- 
tion of  discipline  to  be  entirely  dependable.  Un- 

17 


less  the  employee  does  his  full  duty,  by  obeying 
the  rules  practically  to  the  letter,  flagging  may 
fail  utterly  to  protect  the  train. 

HOW  MISTAKES  OCCUR. 

Weather  Conditions.—  Any  person  who  has 
driven  an  automobile  in  bad  weather  has  been  in 
position  to  appreciate  the  difficulties  which  en- 
ginemen  encounter  who  are  charged  with  the 
safe  operation  of  a  railway  train  under  like  con- 
ditions. Perhaps  the  most  trying  test  of  eye  and 
nerve  in  driving  a  fast  train  is  to  proceed  cau- 
tiously, making  time  as  best  one  can,  in  thick 
fog  or  in  a  blinding  snow  storm.  In  such  a  sit- 
uation much  vigilance  must  be  exercised  to  avoid 
passing  signals  unnoticed.  At  a  speed  of  50  miles 
an  hour  a  train  travels  about  73  feet  per  second, 
and,  at  this  rate,  it  might  happen  that  while  one 
was  merely  turning  his  head  the  train  would 
run  farther  than  the  maximum  distance  at  which 
he  could  see  a.  signal  in  a  thick  fog.  This  fact 
makes  it  almost  obligatory  upon  an  engineman 
when  running  at  high  speed  in  heavy  fog  to  keep 
his  eyes  constantly  to  the  front,  for  should  he 
glance  across  the  cab  to  speak  to  the  fireman,  or 
turn  to  test  his  water  gage  he  might  easily  pass 
a  signal  without  seeing  it. 

It  is  evident  from  the  recorded  testimony  of 
enginemen  that  they  often  take  chances  when 
running  under  these  conditions.  The  truth  of 
this  situation  was  no  doubt  well  expressed  by  one 
who  said,  at  a  public  hearing,  that  he  did  not 
allow  fog  to  interfere  with  his  business  as  long 

18 


as  he  was  "sure  of  his  signal  indications;"  but 
the  uncertainty  of  always  being  "sure"  may  be 
inferred  from  his  further  remark  to  the  effect 
that  if  he  missed  one  of  the  signals  he  would 
know  that  he  had  done  so  and  would  then  get 
ready  to  stop  at  the  next  signal.  He  meant,  of 
course,  that  his  knowledge  of  the  route  was  so 
intimate  that  he  could  not  miss  a  signal  without 
being  almost  immediately  aware  of  the  fact. 
Such  frank  testimony  of  running  practice  in 
foggy  weather  raises  questions  which  operating 
officials  might  reflect  upon  soberly. 

Mental  Conditions. — The  uncertainties  with 
which  train  operation  is  sometimes  involved 
through  stress  of  weather  are,  perhaps,  no 
greater  than  another  class  of  contingencies 
that  arise  in  the  mental  state  of  even  the  most 
reliable  of  men,  at  times.  The  man  who  could 
be  constantly  alert  on  every  occasion,  under 
the  routine  of  handling  a  train  over  the  same 
route  repeatedly,  would  be  exceptional,  to  say 
the  least.  Periods  of  indisposition,  absent- 
mindedness  or  momentary  lapses  of  con- 
sciousness are  only  ordinary  experiences.  To 
concentrate  the  mind  on  what  is  before  the 
eyes,  for  hours  at  a  time,  without  distraction, 
is  something  of  a  tax,  yet  on  a  fast  run  an 
engineman  may  be  passing  block  signals  oftener 
than  one  each  minute;  and  to  him  observa- 
tion of  signals  becomes  a  commonplace  thing. 
To  pull  one's  watch  without  noting  the  time 
of  day,  or  to  straightway  forget  what  time  it 
was,  is  familiar  to  the  experience  of  every 

19 


normal  person,  yet  an  act  of  no  greater  inat- 
tention in  the  observation  of  signals  might, 
in  less  than  a  minute  of  time,  bring  an  engine- 
man  into  trouble.  Many  railway  accidents 
have  been  chargeable  to  the  failure  of  men 
who  have  ranked  high  in  ability  and  record. 
Momentary  lapses  of  consciousness  are  com- 
mon with  the  best  of  men,  and  may  happen 
to  any  one  at  the  most  critical  time.  There 
can  therefore  be  no  absolute  security,  as  long 
as  the  human  ejement  must  be  depended  upon. 
Such  mental  deficiencies  may  befall  any 
person,  through  fatigue  or  loss  of  sleep,  but 
there  are  other  causations  in  the  every-day 
experience  of  people  which  might  render  the 
mind  unfit  for  concentration  on  exacting 
duties.  A  hard  cold,  constipation,  bereave- 
ment, or  agitation  of  the  mind  over  trouble 
might  exert  fully  as  much  influence  to  dis- 
tract the  mind  of  the  employee  as  would  loss 
of  sleep  or  overwork.  The  indiscretion  of 
eating  a  heavy  meal,  with  resulting  stupor 
or  drowsiness,  especially  with  people  in  seden- 
tary occupations,  is  not  a  rare  occurrence; 
and  as  the  occupation  of  enginemen  is  not 
one  of  continuous  physical  activity,  it  is  no 
unheard-of  thing  that  one  will  occasionally 
fall  asleep  at  his  post.  In  this  connection  it 
need  only  be  mentioned,  without  dwelling  upon 
it,  that  many  of  the  conditions  on  a  locomo- 
tive in  operation  induce  sleep — the  heat,  wind 
blowing  in  the  face,  the  monotony  of  rocking 
motion,  vibration,  etc. 

20 


Enginemen  Falling  Dead  on  Duty. — It  is 

rather  remarkable  that  so  few  accidents  have 
happened  to  trains  running  without  control 
through  the  sudden  illness  or  sudden  death 
of  enginemen  at  their  posts.  Occasionally  an 
instance  of  this  kind  has  occurred,  and  it  has 
always  suggested  to  the  mind  of  the  thinking 
person  the  grave  possibilities  of  accident  from 
such  a  cause.  How  many  of  the  accidents 
from  unexplainable  causes  might  have  hap- 
pened in  this  way  is  at  least  an  interesting 
question  to  reflect  upon,  as  the  facts  of  ex- 
perience are  sufficiently  numerous  to  uphold 
a  view  of  the  reasonableness  of  such  an  ex- 
planation, a  few  of  the  known  instances  may 
here  be  cited. 

During  July,  1907,  a  collision  occurred  on 
the  Mobile  &  Ohio  R.  R.  caused  by  the  engine- 
man  of  a  passenger  train  falling  unconscious, 
the  train  running  past  a  station  where  a  stop 
should  have  been  made,  and  the  fireman  not 
discovering  what  was  wrong  in  time  to  stop 
the  train  before  it  collided  with  a  switch 
engine.  A  week  or  two  later  the  engineman 
of  a  passenger  train  of  the  Lake  Shore  & 
Michigan  Southern  Ry.,  approaching  Cleve- 
land, was  overcome  by  heat  and  fell  uncon- 
scious at  the  throttle.  Fortunately  the  fire- 
man observed  the  engineman's  condition  in 
time  to  prevent  accident  to  the  train.  Dur- 
ing the  same  week  the  engineman  of  a  freight 
train  on  the  Chicago,  Rock  Island  &  Pacific 
Ry.  became  suddenly  insane  and  ran  his  train 

21 


a  considerable  distance  at  extraordinary  speed, 
in  fear  of  an  imaginary  enemy  in  pursuit,  in 
spite  of  the  vigorous  efforts  of  his  fireman  to 
prevent  him.  Eventually  the  head  brakeman 
returned  from  a  trip  to  the  rear  and  he  and 
the  fireman  overpowered  the  unfortunate  man 
and  assumed  control  of  the  train.  This 
engineman  had  just  recovered  from  a  spell 
of  sickness  and  had  gone  out  on  his  regular 
run  without  displaying  any  evidence  of  his 
mental  condition. 

In  December  of  the  same  year  the  engine- 
man  of  a  Lehigh  Valley  R.  R.  freight  train 
died  in  his  cab,  suddenly,  the  fireman  not 
aware  of  it,  and  the  train  collided  with 
another  freight  train,  causing  a  bad  wreck 
in  which  the  engineman  was  found  with  no 
apparent  injury  to  the  body  and  not  pinned 
fast,  so  that  he  could  have  extricated  himself 
without  difficulty  had  he  been  alive.  Just  be- 
fore the  collision  the  train  was  flagged  by  the 
rear  brakeman  of  the  train  ahead,  who,  fail- 
ing to  get  attention,  threw  stones  against  the 
cab,  but  there  was  no  response,  so  that  it 
is  reasonably  certain  that  the  engineman  had 
died  before  the  collision  occurred.  Soon  after 
this  the  engineman  of  a  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 
express  train  running  from  Jersey  City  to 
Philadelphia  was  stricken  with  paralysis  in  his 
cab,  near  Torresdale,  and  was  found  entirely 
helpless  by  his  fireman  in  time  to  prevent 
accident.  Six  weeks  later  the  engineman  of 
a  freight  train  of  the  Erie  R.  R.,  west  of 

22 


Marion,  Ohio,  became  suddenly  ill  and  un- 
conscious, and  his  fireman  had  reason  to  think 
that  the  train  had  run  a  considerable  distance 
before  his  condition  was  discovered. 

These  two  collisions  and  four  instances 
where  collision  or  other  accident  might  have 
occurred  but  for  great  good  fortune,  all  hap- 
pened within  a  period  of  eight  months.  It  is 
needless  to  remark  that  they  afford  good 
ground  for  argument  for  automatic  control 
of  trains.  In  this  connection,  the  Central 
London  Tube  Ry.  at  one  time  employed  an 
assistant  motorman  at  the  side  of  the  motor- 
man  in  control  of  the  train,  for  such  emer- 
gencies. 

COLLISIONS  THAT  BLOCK  SIGNALS 
DID  NOT  PREVENT 

Having  outlined  the  manner  in  which  en- 
ginemen  and  other  trainmen  may  and  do  com- 
mit errors  and  bring  trains  into  collision,  it 
will  be  impressive  as  well  as  instructive  to 
narrate  the  circumstances  and  the  particulars 
of  a  few  of  the  serious  collision  wrecks  that 
have  occurred  in  recent  time  on  railroads 
that  were  well  equipped  with  block  signals. 

The  Terra  Cotta  Collision,  B.  &  O.  R.  R.— 
On  Dec.  30,  1906,  there  was  a  rear  collision 
of  passenger  trains  at  Terra  Cotta,  D.  C,  on 
the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  R.  R.,  in  which  43 
people  were  killed  and  about  100  others  were 
injured.  A  train  had  stopped  at  the  station 
and  was  just  pulling  out,  when  a  following 

23 


train,  running  at  high  speed,  on  a  down  grade, 
collided  with  it,  smashing  up  three  coaches. 
The  track  was  under  block  signal  protection 
and  the  signals  were  properly  displayed, 
but  there  was  a  thick  fog  and  the  engineman 
of  the  following  train  said  that  he  failed  to 
see  any  signal. 

The 'Fowler  Collision,  Big  Four  Ry.  —  On 
Jan.  19,  1907,  at  Fowler,  Ind.,  a  passenger 
train  of  the  Cleveland,  Cincinnati,  Chicago  & 
St.  Louis,  Ry.  collided,  head  on,  with  a  freight 
train.  In  a  fog  the  passenger  train,  running 
50  miles  an  hour,  overran  a  block  signal  set 
at  stop.  Sixteen  people  were  either  killed 
outright  or  burned  to  death,  and  ten  others 
were  injured. 

The  engineman  who,  in  this  instance,  ran 
by  a  red  light  signal  at  high  speed  when  the 
weather  conditions  called  for  unusual  caution, 
was  an  employee  with  a  good  record,  which 
would  have  entitled  him  to  confidence  in  any 
situation.  It  was  then  the  custom  of  that 
road  to  test  the  observance  of  signals.  On  his 
last  previous  eastbound  trip  this  engineman 
had  been  checked  up  by  what  is  considered 
the  strongest  test  of  an  engineman's  caution 
and  strict  observance  of  rules.  The  rule  re- 
quired that  he  should  stop  if  a  signal  light 
was  out,  even  though  the  signal  itself  might 
show  the  line  to  be  clear.  At  a  certain  sta- 
tion the  light  was  purposely  extinguished, 
with  the  signal  remaining  at  safety,  but  the 
engineman  distinctly  saw  that  the  signal  was 

24 


at  clear.     He  knew  therefore  that  he  would 
be  safe  in  running  by,  and  that  the  technical 
violation  of  the  rule  would  not  cause  serious 
results;   yet   he   stopped   his   train  with   the 
emergency   application   and   reported   in   the 
station  that  the  light  was  out.    The  fact  that 
the  same  man  on  his  next  trip  caused  a  ter- 
rible disaster,  simply  shows  that  reliance  upon 
good  men  and  thorough  discipline  is  not  the 
final  solution  of  the  problem  of  safety. 
Accidents  on  the  N.  Y.,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.— 
A    bad    derailment    accident    at    Westport, 
Conn.,  on  the  New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hart- 
ford R.  R.,  Oct.  3,  1912,  was  caused  by  too 
fast  speed  through  a  crossover.    The  investi- 
gation showed  that  the  train  struck  the  cross- 
over at  a  speed  of  50  to  60  miles  per  hour. 
The    engineman    disregarded    not    only    the 
company's  rule  that  train  speed  should  not  be 
higher  than  15  miles  per  hour  passing  through 
the  crossover,  but  he  also  disregarded  an  in- 
terlocking distant  signal  at  "caution,"  and  a 
home  signal  in  stop  position,  properly  located 
to  govern  train  movements  through  the  cross- 
over.     The    train    entered    the    crossover    at 
high  speed,  in  spite  of  the  attempts  of  a  work- 
train  conductor  and  a  section  foreman   (the 
latter   standing   in   the   track,    ahead   of   the 
train)  to  flag  the  reckless  engineman  down. 
The  wreck  at  Bridgeport,  Conn.,  July  11, 
the   year   previously,   happened   in   the   same 
way,  in  all  essential  particulars.     The  Fed- 
eral Express  train,  running  60  miles  an  hour, 

25 


passed  both  distant  and  home  signals,  2,200 
feet  apart,  displayed  at  caution  and  stop,  re- 
spectively, without  slackening  speed,  and  took 
a  crossover  lined  up  for  the  train.  Twelve 
people  were  killed  outright  and  40  others 
were  injured. 

On  the  same  road,  Sept.  2,  1913,  a  collision 
wreck  occurred,  between  North  Haven  and 
Wallingford,  Conn.,  in  which  21  people  were 
killed  outright,  five  more  were  fatally  injured 
and  about  50  others  were  injured  more  or  less 
seriously.  A  passenger  train  had  stopped  at 
a  signal  on  a  piece  of  straight  track  where, 
ordinarily,  there  is  a  clear  view  for  two  miles, 
but  at  the  time  of  the  accident  a  dense  fog 
was  on.  The  road  was  properly  block-sig- 
naled, the  signals  were  in  working  order,  and 
in  addition  to  this  a  flagman  had  gone  back  to 
protect  the  rear  of  his  train,  but  to  an  insuf- 
ficient distance. 

The  Amherst  Wreck,  New  York  Central 
R.  R.— On  March  29,  1916,  there  was  a  double 
collision  wreck  of  three  passenger  trains,  near 
Amherst,  Ohio,  on  the  New  York  Central 
R.  R.,  which  resulted  in  the  death  of  27  people 
and  injury  to  47  others.  The  accident  is  of 
peculiar  interest,  owing  to  the  failure  of  an 
engineman  to  observe  a  block  signal  that  was 
properly  displayed  and  the  neglect  of  a  flag- 
man to  do  his  plain  duty. 

The  first  section  of  an  east-bound  passenger 
train  had  been  stopped  at  the  home  signal  of 
an  interlocking  station.  When  the  signal  was 

26 


cleared  the  train  started,  but  slipped  and 
stalled  and  then  got  started  again,  but  before 
it  had  proceeded  more  than  six  or  seven  car 
lengths  it  was  struck  by  the  second  section, 
running  about  SO  miles  per  hour.  The  result 
of  the  collision  was  that  the  locomotive  lifted 
the  rear  end  of  the  rear  car,  a  steel  coach, 
which,  in  turn,  threw  the  car  ahead,  a  wooden 
club  car,  across  the  adjoining  west-bound 
track.  This  collision  took  place  at  3:18  a.  m., 
and  before  any  movement  could  be  made  to 
stop  approaching  trains  the  club  car  was  struck 
and  cut  in  two  by  a  west-bound  train,  known 
as  the  "Twentieth  Century  Limited,"  running 
at  a  speed  of  something  between  50  and  60 
miles  per  hour.  At  the  instant  the  first  col- 
lision occurred  this  train  was  passing  the  in- 
terlocking tower,  only  1,200  feet  distant,  and 
all  three  trains  were  in  collision  within  the 
short  period  of  30  seconds. 

The  road  at  this  point  was  protected  by 
modern  automatic  block  signals,  but  there 
was  a  heavy  fog,  so  that  signals  were  dis- 
tinguishable only  at  close  range — one  to  three 
car  lengths,  according  to  the  varying  testimony 
of  trainmen  who  were  on  the  ground  at  the 
time.  The  engineman  saw  neither  the  home 
nor  distant  signal,  or  misread  them  if  he  did 
see  them.  The  fireman  testified  that  he  did 
not  see  any  signals  for  six  miles  approaching 
the  point  of  collision,  and  was  lost  in  the  fog 
so  completely  that  he  did  not  know  where 
he  was  within  a  mile  or  two.  Aside  from 

27 


this,  the  engineman  had  a  bad  record  for  ob- 
servance of  signals,  having  been  disciplined 
five  times  in  the  preceding  sixteen  years  for 
over-running  block  signals  or  points  desig- 
nated by  orders. 

Let  us  now  consider  how  protection  by 
flagging  failed.  When  the  first  train  began 
to  slow  down  in  making  the  stop  the  rear 
brakeman  lighted  and  threw  off  a  five-minute 
red  fusee.  This  was  not  seen  by  the  engine- 
man  of  the  second  section  and,  in  all  likeli- 
hood, had  burned  out  before  the  second  sec- 
tion came  along,  as  sufficient  time  had  elapsed 
for  it  to  do  so.  When  the  first  section  started, 
the  flagman  got  aboard,  but  when  the  train 
stalled  he  got  off  again  and  then,  for  the 
first  time,  heard  the  second  section  approach- 
ing, and  that  under  steam.  He  then  lighted 
a  fusee  and  ran  west,  but  got  out  only  three  or 
four  car  lengths  by  the  time  the  second  sec- 
tion had  arrived.  This  seems  to  have  been 
the  first  signal  indicating  a  train  in  the  block 
that  either  the  following  engineman  or  his 
fireman  recognized.  This  fusee  w4as  so  near 
the  train  it  was  intended  to  protect  that,  prac- 
tically speaking,  there  was  no  flagman  out;  or, 
in  other  words,  protection  by  flagging  did  not 
exist. 

The  flagman  of  the  first  section  started  out 
right  by  throwing  off  a  lighted  fusee  when  his 
train  slowed  down.  Where  he  failed  was  in  not 
getting  back  a  safe  distance  as  soon  as  the 
stop  was  made  and  planting  another  fusee 

28 


or  torpedoes  when  called  in.  Instead  of  doing 
this  he  hung  around  the  rear  of  his  train  until 
after  the  fusee  had  burned  out,  so  that,  in 
reality,  and  in  short,  that  indispensable  ad- 
junct of  block  signaling,  the  flagman,  was 
absent. 

Mt.  Union  Collision,  Pennsylvania  R.  R. — 
On  Feb.  27,  1917,  a  passenger  train  of  the 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  had  stopped  at  Mt.  Union, 
Pa.,  at  the  station,  and,  when  attempting  to 
start,  the  brakes  on  some  of  the  cars  failed 
to  release,  as  a  result  of  which  the  train  was 
detained  at  the  station  longer  than  the  usual 
time  of  making  a  stop,  and  a  freight  train  fol- 
lowing came  into  collision,  killing  19  pas- 
sengers, and  a  porter  and  injuring  five  others. 

The  wreck  occurred  about  midnight  and  in 
a  heavy  fog.  The  block  signals  at  this  point 
were  about  4,000  feet  apart,  and  as  the  freight 
train,  running  at  a  speed  of  more  than  40 
miles  an  hour,  passed  the  second  signal 
bridge  in  advance  of  Mt.  Union,  on  which  were 
located  the  signals  for  four  tracks,  the  engine- 
man  called  out  a  white  signal.  The  fireman 
and  head  brakeman,  however,  who  were  look- 
ing ahead  at  the  time,  both  called  "green" 
and,  noticing  their  disagreement  with  the 
engineman,  the  fireman  crossed  over  and  in- 
quired of  the  engineman  if  he  did  not  make 
out  a  green  signal.  But  the  engineman  still 
insisted  that  the  signal  was  white,  and  pro- 
ceeded under  steam  until  the  home  signal  for 
the  next  block  was  reached,  when  he  found  a 

29 


red  signal  against  him  and  immediately  ap- 
plied the  emergency  brakes,  shut  off  steam  and 
pulled  the  sand;  but  as  the  passenger  train 
was  standing  only  276  feet  beyond  the  signal, 
the  speed  of  the  freight  train  could  not  be 
appreciably  reduced,  and  the  collision  was 
inevitable.  As  has  happened  so  freqently,  the 
flagman  of  the  passenger  train  was  dilatory 
and  had  gotten  to  the  rear  no  further  than 
300  feet  when  the  collision  occurred. 

All  of  the  employees  concerned  in  this  ac- 
cident were  experienced  in  train  operation 
and  had  excellent  records,  and  the  signals 
were  in  good  working  order,  so  that  human 
liability  to  error  must  be  set  down  as  the 
cause.  As  a  matter  of  official  record,  this 
was  the  fourth  accident  of  the  same  kind  that 
had  happened  on  this  one  railroad  within  a 
four-year  period,  all  of  the  collisions  being 
due  to  non-observance  of  signals  or  mistaking 
the  indications  thereof,  by  enginemen  of  long 
experience  and  good  records. 

The  Earlville  Collision,  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.— 
On  Sept.  17,  1917,  a  freight  train  of  the  Chi- 
cago, Burlington  &  Quincy  R.  R.,  near  Earl- 
ville, 111.,  collided  with  the  rear  of  a  stock  train, 
smashing  four  cars  and  killing  seven  men  in 
a  passenger  coach  at  the  end  of  the  stock 
train.  The  operation  of  these  trains  was 
under  the  block  system,  and  the  cause  of  the 
collision  was  that  the  engineman  on  the  fol- 
lowing train  was  asleep,  and  had  unconscious- 
ly run  past  several  signals,  the  last  one  he 

30 


could  recall  before  meeting  with  the  accident 
being  the  signal  at  Meridian,  ten  miles  from 
where  the  accident  occurred.  At  the  coroner's 
inquest  the  engineman  testified  that  he  had 
been  ill  with  a  cold,  not  having  worked  for 
three  days  previous  to  the  accident.  The  only 
way  in  which  he  could  account  for  his  failure 
was  that  he  was  not  feeling  well  at  the  time 
and  had  been  taking  medicine  for  his  illness 
which  he  thought  might  have  caused  him  to 
go  to  sleep  at  his  post.  « 

The  Ivanhoe  Collision,  Michigan  Central 
R.  R.— On  June  22,  1918,  before  daylight,  an 
empty  troop  train  of  20  sleeping  cars,  follow- 
ing a  circus  train,  on  the  Michigan  Central 
R.  R.,  near  Ivanhoe,  Ind.,  ran  into  the  rear 
of  the  circus  train,  killing  more  than  60  people. 
Fire  broke  out  and  many  injured  passengers 
were  burned  alive. 

This  acident  occurred  on  track  completely 
block-signaled,  with  modern  automatic  ap- 
pliances which  were  working  perfectly.  The 
responsibility  for  this  disaster  was  wholly 
with  the  engineman  who,  at  the  moment  of 
the  collision,  was  fast  asleep;  and  so  soundly 
had  he  slept  that  he  had  not  only  failed  to  see 
the  cautionary  distant  signal,  and  a  stop  sig- 
nal at  the  entrance  of  the  block,  nor  the  tail 
lights  of  the  circus  train,  visible  a  long  distance 
down  the  track,  but  in  addition  to  these  he 
had  passed  a  fusee  burning  in  the  track  and 
another  lighted  fusee  thrown  at  the  cab 
window  by  the  rear  brakeman  of  the  circus 

31 


train  when  he  saw  that  no  effort  was  being 
made  to  stop  the  following  train,  which  was 
coming  right  on  at  good  speed.  The  man 
who  failed  in  this  instance  was  an  engineman 
of  28  years'  experience  with  a  good  previous 
record. 

South  Byron  Collision,  N.  Y.  C.  R.  R.— On 
Jan.  12,  1919,  there  was  a  rear-end  collision 
of  passenger  trains  on  the  New  York  Central 
R.  R.,  at  South  Byron,  N.  Y.,  while  the  train 
in  front  was  at  a  standstill.  The  engineman 
of  the  following  train  failed  to  observe  the 
block  signal  indications,  and  the  flagman  of 
the  first  train  had  not  gone  back  a  sufficient 
distance  to  protect  his  train,  nor  did  he  dis- 
play a  lighted  fusee,  as  required  by  the  rule. 
This  engineman  had  a  faulty  record,  having 
once  been  dismissed  for  using  main  track 
without  flag  protection. 

Fort  Washington  Collision,  P.  &  R.  Ry.— On 
Jan.  13,  1919,  a  through  passenger  train  of  the 
Philadelphia  &  Reading  Ry.  collided  with  the 
rear  of  a  local  passenger  train  while  the  latter 
was  standing  one-quarter  mile  from  Fort 
Washington  station,  Pa.,  killing  14  people  and 
injuring  more  than  20  others.  Failure  of  the 
engineman  to  observe  and  obey  a  block  signal 
was  the  primary  cause.  The  flagman  of  the 
local  train  had  not  gone  out  far  enough  to 
prevent  the  collision. 

The  Elwood  Collision,  Pennsylvania  R.  R. — 
On  August  24,  1919,  there  was  a  rear-end 
collision  between  two  passenger  trains  on  the 

32 


West  Jersey  &  Seashore  division  of  the  Penn- 
sylvania R.  R.,  near  Elwood,  N.  J.,  resulting 
in  the  death  of  one  passenger  and  the  injury 
of  25  passengers  and  one  employee.  This  col- 
lision occurred  on  straight  track,  well  pro- 
tected by  automatic  block  signals.  A  con- 
tributing factor  was  the  foggy  condition  of 
the  weather,  though  the  testimony  shows  that 
signals  could  be  discerned  for  a  distance  of 
ten  or  twelve  car  lengths.  In  addition  to 
passing  both  caution  and  stop  indications  of 
automatic  block  signals  without  regarding 
them,  the  engineman  also  overran  a  burning- 
fusee. 

WHAT  IS  THE  REMEDY? 

The  foregoing  recital  of  facts  shows  that 
the  best  systems  of  block  signals  known  to 
engineers  and  operating  officials,  assisted  by 
flagging,  frequently  have  failed  to  protect 
trains  from  collision.  After  all,  block  signals 
are  nothing  more  than  a  means  of  conveying 
information,  and  they  afford  no  protection 
whatever  when  overrun  by  a  sleepy  or  negli- 
gent engineman,  or  by  one  who  fails  to  see 
the  signal  in  a  fog  or  snow  storm,  or  when  it 
is  obscured  by  a  cloud  of  smoke  or  steam  or 
in  the  glare  of  a  powerful  electric  headlight. 

The  most  perfect  signaling  appliances  in 
extensive  service  on  American  railways  to- 
day fall  just  one  step  short  of  accomplishing 
all  that  is  necessary  to  put  train  operation 
beyond  the  fortuity  of  human  error  or  neglect. 

33 


It  is  certain,  therefore,  that  some  automatic 
device  or  mechanism  that  would  take  the 
control  out  of  the  engineman's  hands  in  event 
he  failed  to  observe  or  regard  a  signal  indica- 
tion that  restricts  the  movement  of  his  train 
is  indispensable  to  safety  of  operation.  The 
need  of  automatic  train  control  has  been 
established  beyond  any  question,  and  the  de- 
mand for  it  is  real  and  urgent.  Automatic 
brake  setting,  or  some  other,  as  yet  unknown, 
scheme  providing  an  equivalent  check,  when 
signals  are  disregarded,  is  bound  to  come 
into  general  use. 

A  fundamental  conception  of  the  present 
situation  was  expressed  as  long  ago  as  1879, 
by  Charles  Francis  Adams,  Jr.,  in  his  book 
"Notes  on  Railroad  Accidents."  The  accuracy 
with  which  he  foresaw  the  danger  points  of 
present  operating  conditions  is  well  recorded 
in  the  remarks  here  quoted: 

"The  American  block  system  of  the  future 
will  be  essentially  different  from  the  present 
English  system.  While  the  operator  is  every- 
where in  the  English  block,  his  place  will  be 
supplied  to  the  utmost  possible  degree  by 

automatic  action  in  the  American The 

effort  in  America,  somewhat  in  advance  of  that 
crowded  condition  of  the  lines  which  makes 
the  adoption  of  something  a  measure  of  pres- 
ent necessity,  has  been  directed  towards  the 
invention  of  an  automatic  system  which  at 
one  and  the  same  time  should  cover  all  the 
dangers  and  provide  for  all  the  needs  which 

34 


have  been  referred  to,  eliminating  the  risk 
incident  to  human  forgetfulness,  drowsiness 
and  weakness  of  nerves.  Can  reliable  auto- 
matic provision  thus  be  made? The  com- 
plicated and  unceasing  train  movement  de- 
pends upon  many  thousand  employees,  all  of 
whom  make  mistakes  or  assume  risks  some- 
times; and  did  they  not  do  so  they  would  be 
either  more  or  less  than  men.  Being,  however, 
neither  angels  nor  machines,  but  ordinary 
mortals  whose  services  are  bought  for  money 
at  the  average  market  rate  of  wages,  it  would 
certainly  seem  no  small  point  gained  if  an 
automatic  machine  could  be  placed  on  guard 
over  those  whom  it  is  the  great  effort  of  rail- 
road discipline  to  reduce  to  automatons." 

Considering  the  time  when  these  observa- 
tions were  made,  they  show  that  Mr.  Adams 
was  somewhat  in  advance  of  his  day  in  grasp- 
ing the  needs  of  American  railways  in  the 
way  of  block  signals.  The  extensive  use  of 
automatic  block  signals  predicted  by  Mr. 
Adams  has  come  to  pass,  and  his  suggestion 
of  the  automatic  control  of  trains  points  to 
that  essential  feature  of  operation  in  which 
our  railroads  are  now  found  deficient. 

The  Inadequacy  of  Discipline. — The  argu- 
ments that  were  once  used  to  discourage  the 
idea  of  automatic  train  control  might  have 
led  some  to  believe  that  a  gradual  improve- 
ment in  the  discipline  of  trainmen  in  this 
country  was  to  be  expected.  Whoever  may 
have  entertained  such  a  view  has  certainly 

35 


been  disappointed,  for  neither  generally  ob- 
served conditions  nor  results  have  confirmed 
it.  Neither  is  the  situation  in  other  countries 
satisfactory  in  this  respect. 

Some  of  those  who  have  been  opposed  to  the 
idea  of  automatic  train  stops,  on  the  ground 
that  a  good  system  of  block  signals  with  en- 
ginemen  trained  to  a  high  standard  of  dis- 
cipline, should  afford  adequate  protection, 
have  often  referred  to  the  accident  records  of 
English  railways  to  substantiate  their  con- 
tention. It  is  known,  however,  that  the  En- 
glish railways,  obviously  for  some  good  rea- 
son, have  for  years  been  experimenting  with 
cab  signals  as  an  additional  precaution  for 
safety,  nothwithstanding  the  prevailing  block 
system  of  train  operation  and  the  good  repu- 
tation of  their  enginemen  for  discipline.  Ac- 
cording to  official  accident  records,  however, 
the  reliability  of  block  signal  equipment  and 
of  enginemen  to  observe  signal  indications  do 
not  come  as  near  perfection  as  is  generally  sup- 
posed to  be  the  case. 

In  one  ten-year  period  there  were  137  rail- 
way accidents  in  Great  Britain,  due  to  over- 
running signals  and  to  imperfections  in  the 
signaling  system  itself.  Of  these,  47  accidents 
were  caused  by  the  overrunning  of  signals  by 
fault  of  the  enginemen,  either  through  non- 
observance  or  disregard;  61  accidents  were 
due  to  irregularities  of  the  block  system  (man- 
ual block),  including  8  failures  of  signals;  and 
21  more  accidents  were  caused  by  faults  of 

36 


the  signalmen.  Subsequent  records  have 
shown  that  improvement  of  the  signal  instal- 
lations, including  the  use  of  the  track  circuit, 
had  reduced  the  number  of  accidents  caused 
by  irregularities  in  the  operation  of  the  block 
system  by  fifty  per  cent,  but  there  was  no  re- 
duction in  the  number  of  accidents  caused  by 
overrunning  signals. 

Train  operation  in  Great  Britain  having  al- 
ways been  held  up  as  the  criterion  for  safety, 
such  an  exhibit  ought  to  be  convincing  testi- 
mony to  the  fact  that  human  error,  even  in  the 
presence  of  the  most  reliable  of  block  signal 
arrangements,  is  a  cause  of  railway  accidents 
the  world  over;  and  comparisons  of  the  acci- 
dent records  of  the  United  States,  England  and 
other  European  countries,  while  they  may  in- 
dicate some  differences  in  degree,  really  show 
no  differences  in  kind.  In  England  the  liability 
to  error  with  block  signals  .in  the  hands  of 
highly-trained  men  is  recognized,  and  in  addi- 
tion to  this  they  have  more  fog  to  contend 
with  than  we  have.  For  this  reason  the  use 
of  detonators  (torpedoes)  as  an  auxiliary  to 
fixed  signals,  to  call  the  attention  of  engine- 
men  to  the  signal  indications  in  times  of 
heavy  fog,  is  in  very  general  practice.  The 
expense  of  stationing  "fogmen"  at  the  side  of 
the  track  to  repeat  the  signal  indications  by 
means  of  audible  signals  is  considerable,  and 
this  has  led  to  the  development  of  a  device 
known  as  the  torpedo  placer,  which  has  been 
used  to  some  extent.  This  automatically  places 

37 


a  torpedo  upon  the  rail  simultaneously  with 
the  setting  of  the  signal.  The  explosion  of 
the  torpedo  warns  the  engineman  of  the  posi- 
tion of  the  signal.  The  use  of  safeguards  as 
auxiliary  to  the  wayside  signals  is  therefore 
in  considerable  and  regular  service,  so  that  the 
proposition  of  placing  an  auxiliary  system  on 
the  locomotives  in  the  form  of  cab  signals  is 
not  at  all  inconsistent  with  English  ideas. 

Thus  it  has  been  shown  that  our  own 
country  is  by  no  means  the  only  one  where 
carefully-operated  ,block  signal  systems  and 
studiously  prepared  and  strictly  enforced  rules 
for  the  use  of  the  same  fail  to  safeguard  trains  as 
well  as  could  be  desired.  To  some  extent, 
however,  a  false  standard  of  ethics  with  block 
signal  experts  has  stood  opposed  to  the  pur- 
suit of  further  means  of  protection.  Signal 
engineers,  with  both  railroads  and  manufac- 
turers, have  labored  industriously  and  ingeni- 
ously, and  have  produced  apparatus  re- 
markable for  its  high  order  of  perfection,  yet 
the  practical  efficiency  of  the  whole  system  is 
still  dependent  upon  human  reliability  as  much 
as  upon  perfection  of  mechanism.  This  fact 
might  be  expected  to  strike  signalmen  in  an 
unwelcome  manner,  but  the  further  considera- 
tion that  the  responsibility  for  lapse  of  dis- 
cipline is  not  theirs  does  not  change  the 
situation.  Pride  over  the  high  efficiency  of 
existing  equipment  is  commendable,  but  it 
should  not  stand  in  the  way  of  possibility  of 
further  progress  toward  safety.  In  the  light 

38 


of  every-day  railroad  experience,  one  cannot 
dismiss  from  his  mind  that  the  idea  of  placing 
both  men  and  machines  under  automatic  con- 
trol is  a  "consummation  devoutly  to  be 
wished." 

PROGRESS  WITH  AUTOMATIC  TRAIN 
CONTROL 

As  clearly  as  the  necessity  for  automatic 
control  of  train  operation  has  been  seen  in  the 
past  three  decades,  the  progress,  nevertheless, 
has  been  very  slow,  especially  so  when  one 
takes  account  of  the  great  advance  that  has 
been  made  in  th/.  ^OOStruction  of  track,  rolling 
stock,  station  buiU'^o's  ^fld  terminals,  as  well 
as  in  the  refinement  of  passenger  equipment, 
increase  in  speed,  train  tonnage,  etc.  Auto- 
matic train  stops  are  now  in  use  on  a  few 
rjailroads  in  this  country,  covering  a  small 
mileage,  and  they  have  been  used  or  experi- 
mented with  in  a  spasmodic  sort  of  way  for 
upwards  of  25  years,  about  the  first  notable 
experiments  being  those  installed  on  elevated 
railways  in  Chicago  during,  and  immediately 
following,  the  World's  Fair.  On  the  Boston 
Elevated  Ry.  and  in  the  tunnels  and  subways 
of  New  York  and  Philadelphia  there  is  an 
aggregate  length  of  105^  miles  of  road 
equipped  with  automatic  train  stop  devices. 

It  must  be  said  that  but  little  effort  has 
been  made  by  the  railroads  in  this  country  to 
develop  automatic  train  control.  Very  few 
railroad  managements  have  encouraged  it  by 

39 


either  moral  or  financial  co-operation,  and 
various  pleas,  of  more  or  less  plausibility, 
have  been  made  to  put  the  matter  off. 
Among  these  have  been  the  insistence  that 
proper  discipline  on  the  part  of  the  trainmen, 
in  obedience  to  the  indications  of  approved 
installations  of  block  signals,  should  afford 
adequate  protection  to  trains;  and  another 
has  been  the  claim  that  no  system  of  automatic 
control  sufficiently  developed  to  meet  all  the 
requirements  was  available.  As  hereinbefore 
shown,  experience  has  abundantly  proven 
that  the  excellence  of  discipline  in  con- 
templation has  never  fceen  realized;  and  as 
for  the  state  of  the  art  of  designing  automatic 
train  control  devices,  it  is  the  opinion  of  the 
writer,  supported  by  the  views  of  men  of 
long  experience  in  signaling  and  train  oper- 
ation, that  if  anything  has  been  wanting  in 
this  direction  it  has  been  because  whole- 
hearted efforts  have  not  been  made  to  follow 
up  excellent  and  promising  beginnings. 

The  prospect  of  the  expense  of  installation 
and  maintenance  has  undoubtedly  been  the 
chief  reason  for  the  hesitancy  to  undertake 
experiments  in  automatic  train  control;  and 
about  the  only  consistent  line  of  defense 
which  has  been  made  was  that  trial  of  con- 
trol systems  in  earnest  would  result  in  a 
popular  demand  for  the  general  equipment  of 
railroads  with  such  devices  in  advance  of  the 
financial  ability  of  the  roads  to  install  the 
same.  The  Government  has  been  interested 

40 


in  this  question  for  some  years,  and  the 
Safety  Bureau  of  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  has  repeatedly  recommended 
that  railroads  generally  should  undertake  ex- 
periments with  automatic  train  stops,  with  a 
view  of  developing  something  which  could  be 
adopted  in  standard  practice. 

Government  Investigations.  —  The  urgent 
public  demand  for  some  means  to  promote 
the  safety  of  railway  travel  led  to  congres- 
sional enactment,  in  1906,  directing  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  to  investigate  and 
report  upon  the  use  of  and  necessity  for  block 
-signal  systems,  and  appliances  for  the  auto- 
matic control  of  trains.  The  first  report  of 
the  Commission,  after  investigation,  was 
made  to  Congress,  Feb.  23,  1907,  and  was 
published  as  Senate  Document  No.  342,  2nd 
Session,  59th  Congress. 

This  report  gave  quite  full  information  on 
the  use  of  and  necessity  for  block  signal  sys- 
tems in  train  operation,  but,  because  of  the 
limited  extent  to  which  automatic  train  con- 
trol appliances  had  been  installed  on  the  rail- 
roads, had  but  little,  other  than  merely  theo- 
retical, information  to  give  concerning  them. 
Accordingly  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission recommended  to  Congress  that  an 
appropriation  be  made  sufficient  to  secure  the 
services  of  men  competent  to  supervise  and 
conduct  experimental  tests  of  any  automatic 
train-control  devices  that  appeared  to  be 
worthy  of  trial.  By  an  act  of  March  4,  1907, 

41 


an  appropriation  of  $50,000  was  made  avail- 
able for  this  purpose,  but  restricted  to  si^ch 
signal  systems  and  appliances  as  might  be 
furnished  in  connection  with  the  investigation 
"free  of  cost  to  the  Government/' 

In  order  to  carry  out  the  terms  of  this  Act 
the  Commission  organized  and  established 
the  Block  Signal  and  Train  Control  Board, 
which  was  appointed  July  10,  1907.  Under 
the  auspices  of  this  board  two  experimental 
installations  of  a  system  of  automatic  train 
control  designed  by  the  Rowell-Potter  Safety 
Stop  Co.,  of  Chicago,  was  made  on  the  Chi- 
cago, Burlington  &  Quincy  R.  R.,  and  put  in 
service  in  October,  1908.  One  of  these  in- 
stallations was  on  5*/2  miles  of  single  track, 
between  Sugar  Grove  and  Big  Rock,  111.,  and 
the  other  on  3  miles  of  double  track,  between 
Aurora  and  Eola,  111.  These  trials  were  in 
every  way  practical,  as  the  signals  governed 
the  operation  of  all  trains  passing  over  the 
road,  in  each  case. 

The  same  system  had  previously  been  in- 
stalled, experimentally,  at  an  interlocking 
plant  of  the  Peoria,  Decatur  &  Evansville  and 
the  St.  Louis,  Peoria  &  Northern  Roads,  at 
Hawley,  III,  in  1899;  and  again  on  four  blocks 
of  the  Chicago,  Milwaukee  &  St.  Paul  Ry., 
between  Pacific  Junction  and  Edgebrook,  111., 
on  the  Milwaukee  division,  in  1902.  This 
system  was  of  the  mechanical  trip  type,  auto- 
matic train  control  being  effected  by  means 
of  track  instruments  interlocked  with  the  sig- 

42 


nals,  so  that  should  an  engineman  ignore  or 
fail  to  observe  a  stop  signal  against  him  his 
brakes  were  automatically  applied  by  con- 
tact of  the  brake-setting  device  on  the  loco- 
motive with  the  track  instrument  in  the  "up" 
position.  A  unique  feature  of  this  system 
was  that  the  power  for  moving  the  signals 
and  train  stop  trip  was  stored  in  a  series  of 
twelve  heavy  coiled  springs  that  were  wound 
up,  like  a  wTatch,  by  a  lever  and  ratchet  oper- 
ated by  the  undulations  of  the  track  rails 
under  passing  trains.  The  mechanism*,  all 
told,  was  the  most  elaborate  design  for  the 
purpose  that  has  been  installed  anywhere, 
even  to  this  day. 

The  operation  of  these  two  installations 
was  put  under  the  observation  of  an  inspector 
appointed  by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission, who  made  daily  record  of  the  be- 
havior of  them.  After  these  trials  had  been 
under  way  for  six  months  the  Block  Signal 
and  Train  Control  Board  reported  that  if  cer- 
tain minor  faults  in  the  details  of  the  design 
of  the  mechanism  were  remedied,  and  the 
board  saw  "no  reason  why  they  should  not 
be  substantially  overcome,  the  system  would 
be  safe  and  reliable  and  its  use  would  tend 
materially  to  promote  safety  of  operation  on 
a  railroad  using  it." 

In  its  report  of  Dec.  26,  1.911,  the  Board, 


"Completely  described  and  illustrated  in  the  Railway  (and 
Engineering)  Review  of  Jan.  6,  1900;  March  15,  1902;  and 
Dec.  26.  1908. 

43 


with  further  information  obtained  from  tests 
of  two  automatic  stops  of  the  intermittent 
electrical  contact  type,  and  another  of  the  me- 
chanical trip  type,  concluded  that  there  were 
"several  types  of  apparatus  and  methods  of 
application  which,  if  put  into  use  by  the  rail- 
roads, would  quickly  develop  to  a  degree  of 
efficiency  adequate  to  meet  all  reasonable  de- 
mands. Such  devices  properly  installed  and 
maintained  would  add  materially  to  safety  in 
the  operation  of  trains.  In  many  situations, 
under  conditions  existing  in  this  country,  the 
Board  is  convinced  that  the  use  of  automatic 
train  stops  is  necessary  to  the  safe  operation 
of  trains." 

This  board  was  in  existence  four  years, 
and  made  annual  reports,  but  general  interest 
on  the  subject  was  lacking  to  such  an  extent 
that  the  board  was  finally  abolished  for  dearth 
of  experience  to  report  upon  in  the  way  of 
actual  practice  with  automatic  train  control. 
In  its  discussion  of  progress  in  this  direction 
the  railroads  were  charged  with  being  "decid- 
edly lax  in  developing  the  automatic  stop." 
It  was  urged  that  the  roads  should  be  "ex- 
pected to  develop  the  art  of  automatic  train 
control  so  as  to  provide  devices  which  will 
meet  their  operating  conditions.  This  ap- 
pears to  the  Board  to  be  entirely  practicable, 
and  should  it  not  be  done  with  a  reasonable 
degree  of  expedition,  steps  should  be  taken 
by  the  Government  to  stimulate  such  action." 

44 


In  its  final  report  of  June  29,  1912,  besides 
recommending  the  compulsory  adoption  of 
the  block  system  by  all  interstate  passenger 
railroads,  the  conclusion  of  the  board  was  that 
"The  development  of  the  automatic  train  stop 
has  proceeded  far  enough  to  warrant  the  ex- 
pectation that  by  its  use  greater  safety  can  be 
secured  in  the  operation  of  trains.  Railroads 
should  be  given  to  understand  that  the  auto- 
matic train  stop  must  be  developed  by  them 
as  rapidly  as  possible/' 

The  commendable  work  accomplished  by 
this  Board,  in  its  investigations  and  recom- 
mendations, seems  to  have  been  forgotten  or 
ignored  by  railroad  managements,  in  general, 
for  in  the  eight  years  intervening  they  have 
sat  by  and  awaited  "developments."  An  au- 
tomatic train  control  committee  appointed  by 
the  United  States  Railroad  Administration, 
in  January,  1919,  after  some  investigation,  re- 
ported, at  the  end  of  the  year,  without,  how- 
ever, having  made  any  considerable  study  of 
automatic  train  control  systems  "undergoing 
test  upon  various  lines  of  railroad,"  as  they 
had  been  instructed  to  do,  although  there  was 
opportunity  to  have  done  so  with  systems  in 
regular  operation  on  the  Chicago  &  Eastern 
Illinois  R.  R.  and  on  the  Chesapeake  &  Ohio 
R.  R.  The  report  of  this  committee,  which 
is  mainly  descriptive,  and  but  mildly  recom- 
mendatory, might  mislead  the  younger  gener- 
ation to  suppose  that  experiments  in  auto- 
matic train  control  are  a  new  thing;  whereas 

45 


the  need  of  the  improvement,  the  practica- 
bility of  it,  and  the  adaptability  of  available 
devices  had  all  been  settled  by  the  Block  Sig- 
nal and  Train  Control  Board  eight  years 
before. 

ELEMENTARY  PROBLEMS 
Early  ideas  on  automatic  train  control  con- 
templated nothing  further  than  stop  devices 
operating  in  unison  with  the  wayside  signals. 
However,  it  soon  became  a  question  whether, 
if  such  were  applied  to  the  usual  arrangement 
of  home  and  distant  signals,  either  at  inter- 
lockings  or  with  block  signals,  it  would  not 
operate  to  delay  trains  unnecessarily  in  some 
situations,  and  to  reduce  the  capacity  of 
tracks — this  for  the  reason  that  the  stop 
device  would  have  to  be  placed  maximum 
braking  distance  from  the  home  signal;  for 
to  place  it  at  the  home  signal  would  not  allow 
sufficient  stopping  distance  to  protect  a  train 
near  the  entrance  to  the  block  unless  overlap 
were  provided.  The  overlap  is  an  arrange- 
ment of  circuits  which  allows  braking  dis- 
tance beyond  the  home  signal.  One  of  the 
utilities  of  it  is  to  dispense  with  distant  sig- 
nals, although  it  has  sometimes  been  used 
with  both  home  and  distant  signals,  as  on  the 
electrified  lines  of  the  New  York  Central 
R.  R. 

Having  in  view  these  possibilities,  some 
systems  of  train  control  have  been  designed 
for  adaptation  with  the  overlap  arrangement. 

46 


The  installations  of  the  Rowell-Potter  system 
of  automatic  train  control,  heretofore  referred 
to,  were  with  signals  operating  on  the  over- 
lap principle. 

Speed  Control. — As  the  use  of  distant  and 
home  signals  is  the  prevailing  arrangement  in 
this  country,  there  arises  the  problem  of  com- 
pelling obedience  to  the  indications  of  the 
distant  signal  without  unnecessary  delay  and 
still  retain  the  protective  feature.  This  can 
be  done  only  through  some  means  of  speed 
control,  whereby,  if  a  train  passes  the  distant 
signal  under  proper  control,  "prepared  to 
stop  at  the  home  signal,"  the  automatic  brake- 
setting  mechanism  is  rendered  inoperative; 
or,  should  the  train  pass  the  distant  signal  at 
too  high  speed  the  brakes  will  be  applied  to 
bring  the  train  under  control. 

One  way  of  accomplishing  this  purpose  is 
through  the  use  of  a  centrifugal  governor 
connected  with  an  axle  of  the  engine,  the 
adjustment  of  the  device  being  such  that  con- 
trol of  the  brakes  is  not  brought  into  action 
so  long  as  a  designated  speed  is  not  exceeded. 
Several  systems  of  automatic  train  control 
employ  such  a  mechanism  to  effect  speed 
control,  but  there  are  other  contrivances  to 
accomplish  the  same  purpose.  Some  of  the 
objects  for  which  speed  control  may  be  used, 
including  the  aforesaid,  are  the  following: 

I.  To  permit  a  train  to  pass  a  brake  appli- 
cation point  at  designated  speed,  or  slower, 
without  receiving  an  automatic  application. 

47 


2.  To   permit    a    train   to   proceed   at   low 
speed  after  having  been  stopped  by  an  auto- 
matic application  of  the  brakes. 

3.  After     automatic     application     of     the 
brakes  to  permit  release  of  the  same  when 
the  speed  has  been  reduced  to  a  designated 
rate. 

4.  To  permit  a  train  to  pass  an  approach 
indication  point  without  an  automatic  appli- 
cation of  the  brakes,  providing  the  engineman 
properly  observes  the  approach  indication. 

5.  To  permit  a  train  to  proceed  without  an 
automatic  application  of  the  brakes  as  long 
as  the  speed  is  controlled  in  accordance  with 
the  signal  indications. 

6.  To  prevent  a  designated  speed  being  ex- 
ceeded regardless  of  block  conditions. 

7.  To    prevent    a    designated    speed    being 
exceeded    between    certain    points,    as    on    a 
sharp   curve.     This   result   may  be   arranged 
for  by  proper  location  of  ramps  or  equivalent 
control   appliances. 

In  itself,  the  train-stopping  feature  is  sim- 
ple, but  it  has  been  commonly  supposed  that 
the  requirements  of  speed  control  would  in- 
troduce complications.  Some  have  seized 
upon  this  as  an  excuse  for  hesitating  to  under- 
take experimental  installations  of  train  con- 
trol. In  defense  of  their  tardiness  in  this 
respect  speed  control  has  been  a  convenient 
scarecrow. 

One  feature  of  block  signal  operation  in 
this  country  which  has  stood  in  opposition 

48 


to  the  principle  of  automatic  train  control,  is 
the  quite  prevalent,  but  more  or  less  danger- 
ous, practice  of  "permissive"  use  of  blocks. 
By  this  readers  understand  the  permission 
given  to  an  engineman,  in  a  following  move- 
ment on  double  track,  to  pass  a  home  signal 
in  the  stop  position  and  proceed  into  an  oc- 
cupied block,  providing  he  does  so  at  slow 
speed,  with  his  train  at  all  times  under  ready 
control.  The  regulations  usually  require  that 
the  train  must  first  be  brought  to  a  stop  be- 
fore passing  the  signal,  and  sometimes  the 
rule  requires  that  the  engineman  must  wait 
one  or  two  minutes  before  proceeding.  The 
dangerous  tendency  in  such  practice  is  that 
of  enginemen  to  fall  into  the  habit  of  pro- 
ceeding in  the  block  at  too  high  speed,  with- 
out first  stopping  at  the  signal,  thus  disobeying 
the  rule  and  often  causing  a  collision,  espe- 
cially in  foggy  weather.  With  automatic 
block  signals  there  is  no  telltale  to  serve  as  a 
restraint  on  enginemen  against  taking  such 
chances.  The  too  prevalent  use  of  "permissive" 
running  has  had  most  to  do  in  bringing  about 
the  existing  widespread  prejudice  against  the 
idea  of  putting  a  complete  check  on  engine- 
men,  which  the  most  highly  developed  sys- 
tems of  roadside  signals  fail  to  do. 

As  illustrating  the  importance  of  speed 
control  on  safe  carrying  capacity  of  tracks 
the  experience  of  a  certain  elevated  railway 
in  the  early  days  of  automatic  train  control 
on  such  roads  may  be  mentioned.  After  the 

49 


automatic  stops  had  been  installed  it  was 
found  that  the  schedules  could  not  be  main- 
tained by  absolute  blocking,  thus  making  it 
necessary  to  resort  to  permissive  running, 
but  still  the  automatic  stopping  of  the  trains 
caused  exasperating  delays,  and  the  system 
was  finally  taken  out  of  service. 

As  another  illustration  the  experience  of 
the  Interborough  Rapid  Transit  Ry.  in  one  of 
the  subways  of  New  York  City,  will  be  cited. 
That  road  was  equipped,  many  years  ago, 
with  the  Kinsman  system  of  automatic  train 
control,  which  uses  automatic  stops  of  the 
electrically  -  controlled  mechanical  trip  type. 
As  first  arranged,  a  train,  at  whatever  speed, 
could  not  pass  a  stop  signal  without  being 
"tripped"  and  brought  to  a  stop.  Under  these 
conditions  the  shortest  practicable  headway 
between  trains  was  2  minutes;  and,  with  sta- 
tion stops  of  46  seconds,  the  maximum  move- 
ment over  one  track  was  30  trains  per  hour. 
Owing  to  congestion  of  traffic  it  was  highly 
desirable  to  increase  the  track  capacity,  and 
this  was  accomplished  by  means  of  speed  con- 
trol,* which  resulted  in  decreasing  the  head- 
way between  trains  to  1  minute,  39  seconds, 
and  increasing  the  track  capacity  to  36.4  trains 
per  hour,  or  a  gain  in  carrying  capacity  of 
21.3  per  cent  on  each  track. 

By  means  of  the  speed-control  signals  there 
installed  a  train  may,  if  under  proper  control, 

*The  details  of  the  change  are   described   in   the   Railway 
(and  Engineering)  Review  of  July  2,  1910,  page  645. 

50 


approach  a  station  at  which  a  preceding  train 
on  the  same  track  is  discharging  passengers, 
without  being  stopped,  where,  formerly,  a  train 
in  like  circumstances  was  stopped  and  held 
at  a  signal  until  the  preceding  train  had 
cleared  the  station.  The  automatic  train 
stop  is  the  "control"  feature  of  this  system 
and,  so  far  as  this  road  is  concerned,  the  au- 
tomatic stop  is  a  highly  dependable  device, 
and  no  experiment. 

It  is  not  to  be  inferred,  of  course,  that  the 
identical  system  of  signals  which  is  working 
so  satisfactorily  on  this  road  of  very  heavy 
traffic  would  be  adaptable  to  general  condi- 
tions of  the  heavy'-traffic  railroads  on  the 
surface,  yet  the  principles  of  installation  and 
operation  there  followed  may  undoubtedly  be 
studied  with  profit. 

LINES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 
Cab  Signals — In  a  general  way  signal 
engineers  have  sought  to  improve  upon  block 
signaling  as  a  means  of  train  protection  in 
two  ways.  One  of  these,  as  already  shown, 
is  by  the  use  of  automatic  devices  to  apply  the 
brakes  should  the  engineman  fail  to  observe 
a  stop  signal  or  disregard  it.  The  other  is 
by  the  use  of  signals  in  the  locomotive  cab, 
to  repeat  the  indications  of  the  wayside  sig- 
nals, in  order  that  the  engineman  might  be 
warned  should  he,  for  any  reason,  pass  a 
caution  or  stop  signal  unawares.  Such  are  gen- 
erally know^n  as  cab  signals,  and  they  may 

51 


consist  of  miniature  semaphore  or  position 
signals,  colored  lights,  or  audible  signals, 
(bells  or  whistles) ;  or  a  combination  of  two 
or  more  of  these. 

The  desirability  of  cab  signals,  as  an  auxil- 
iary of  wayside  signals,  was  seen  in  England 
long  ago,  owing  to  the  trouble  and  uncer- 
tainty of  running  in  fogs.  They  have,  there- 
fore, been  more  extensively  used  or  experi- 
mented with  in  England  and  other  European 
countries  than  in  this.  Some  experimenting 
with  cab  signals  has  been  done  in  this  coun- 
try, however,  and  particularly  with  installa- 
tions combining  both  cab  signal  and  auto- 
matic stop  functions.  The  Julian-Beggs* 
experimental  installation  on  20  miles  of  the 
Cincinnati,  New  Orleans  &  Texas  Pacific  Ry., 
in  1916,  combined  cab  signal,  automatic  stop 
and  speed  control  appliances.  The  Miller 
automatic  stop  system,  which  has  been  in  reg- 
ular operation,  with  automatic  block  signals, 
on  106  miles  of  double  track  of  the  Chicago 
&  Eastern  Illinois  R.  R.,  between  Chicago 
and  Danville,  111.,  for  more  than  four  years 
past,  is  designed  to  include  cab  signals,  but  is 
being  operated  without  them. 

The  use  of  cab  signals  as  a  means  of  block 
operation,  with  or  without  the  automatic 
train-stop  feature,  and  without  wayside  sig- 
nals, is  possible,  but  the  idea  has  not  gained 

^Described   in   detail  in   the    Railway  Review   of   May  27, 
1916,  and  May  26,  1917. 

52 


footing  in  this  country,  as  yet.  Perhaps  the 
best  argument  against  such  a  proposition 
would  be  that,  with  the  double  system — that 
is  with  wayside  signals  in  addition  to  cab 
signals  or  automatic  train  stops  as  an  auxil- 
iary, there  would  still  be  an  independent  sys- 
tem of  signals  for  protection  in  case  the  de- 
vices on  the  train  were,  by  any  chance  or  ac- 
cident, put  out  of  service.  Moreover,  unless 
fixed,  or  wayside,  signals  were  used  there 
would  be  no  signal  protection  to  foreign  or 
unequipped  locomotives  passing  over  the 
road. 

Types  of  Apparatus. — The  variety  in  designs 
of  automatic  train  control  devices  that  have 
been  experimented  with,  or  are  now  available 
for  trial,  is  large.  The  Automatic  Train  Con- 
trol Committee  has  found  sixteen  different 
devices  or  systems  sufficiently  developed  to 
be  worthy  of  test.  These  comprise  electric- 
ally-controlled mechanical  trip,  intermittent 
electrical  contact,  inert  roadside  element,  in- 
duction, and  continuous  induction  types. 
Excluding  the,  as  yet,  experimental  instal- 
lations, those  that  are  now  operating  in  regu- 
lar service  employ,  for  transmitting  the  indi- 
cation to  the  train,  either  electrically-con- 
trolled mechanical  trips,  or  intermittent  elec- 
trical contact  by  means  of  ramps,  at  the  road- 
side. A  ramp  is  a  long  metal  bar  or  length 
of  rail,  with  down-sloping  ends,  in  a  fixed 
position  on  or  near  the  ends  of  the  ties,  to 
engage  a  shoe  or  brush  on  the  train,  to  make 
the  desired  contact. 

53 


The  Kinsman  automatic  train  control  ap- 
paratus is  in  regular  service  on  the  New  York 
Municipal  (569  stops),  the  Interborough  Rap- 
id Transit  (1813  stops),  the  Hudson  &  Man- 
hattan (290  stops),  and  the  Pennsylvania 
Tunnel  &  Terminal  (52  stops)  subway  lines 
in  New  York  City;  in  the  Philadelphia  Rapid 
Transit  subway  (136  stops)  in  Philadelphia; 
and  on  the  Boston  Elevated  Ry.  (207  stops). 
All  of  these  installations  have  electrically- 
controlled  mechanical  trips,  in  most  cases  at 
the  roadside,  the  trip  arm  being  operated 
electrically  or  pneumatically.  In  addition  to 
the  Interborough,  as  already  stated,  the  Mu- 
nicipal and  the  Hudson  &  Manhattan  roads 
have  speed  control,  time-limit  relays  being 
used  to  define  the  time  allowed  for  a  train 
to  run  a  definite  distance.  In  these  instal- 
lations the  roadside  trip  arm  may  be  moved 
from  the  stop  to  the  proceed  position,  by  the 
trainmen  standing  on  the  ground,  when  nec- 
essary to  pass  a  signal  in  the  stop  position; 
but  the  trip  assumes  the  stop  position  as  soon 
as  it  is  released. 

The  American  Train  Control  system,  which 
has  been  in  regular  operation  on  the  Chesa- 
peake &  Ohio  R.  R.  for  three  years  past,  is 
now  installed  on  a  busy  section  of  21  miles  of 
single  track,  between  Charlottesville  and  Gor- 
donsville,  Va.  It  combines  automatic  stop, 
cab  signal  (both  visible  and  audible),  and 
approach  indication  features,  but  no  speed 
control. 

54 


It  works  in  connection  with  automatic  block 
which  has  color  light  signals,  but  is  designed  to 
be  used  without  wayside  signals;  and  the  first 
installation,  on  7  miles  of  track,  was  so  installed 
and  operated  for  a  time.  The  installation  of  this 
system  of  automatic  train  control  displaced  the 
existing  system  of  manual  block,  and  the  saving 
effected  in  wages  of  block  operators  dispensed 
with  has  paid  interest  on  the  new  investment  for 
train  control. 

This  system  has  ramps  located  in  pairs,  in 
advance  of  the  signal,  the  right-hand  ramp  being 
used  for  the  stop,  and  the  left-hand  for  the 
approach  indication  for  the  next  block.  For 
back-up  movements  there  is  a  circuit  reverser, 
which  transposes  the  normal  functions  of  the 
contact  shoes,  in  order  to  receive  the  proper 
sequence  of  signals.  This  arrangement  provides 
the  engineman  with  a  second  shoe  for  automatic 
stopping  in  case  either  shoe  should  be  lost,  dam- 
aged or  otherwise  be  put  out  of  commission;  the 
stop  shoe,  in  that  case,  being  made  to  work  the 
caution  signal,  or  the  caution  shoe  to  work  the 
stop  valve.  The  usual  accidental  conditions  on 
track,  such  as  open  switches,  cars  fouling  main 
line,  and  broken  rails,  cause  the  system  to  operate . 
-on  train  control  with  full  effect,  and  automatic 
stopping  for  such  reasons  has  been  among  the 
experiences  of  this  installation. 

The  visible  type  of  cab  signal  first  installed  is 
a  standard  two-position  tower  indicator,  with 

55 


miniature  semaphore,  but,  on  the  locomotives 
later  equipped,  lights  are  used.  The  clear  indica- 
tion is  by  a  white  light  and  the  caution  by  a  green 
light,  and  when  the  automatic  stop  valve  drops 
the  lights  go  out ;  although  the  design  is  such  that 
a  red  light  can  be  added  for  the  stop  indication 
if  desired;  but  it  is  considered  against  good  prac- 
tice to  use  it.  A  vibrating  bell,  operated  by  the 
engine  battery,  gives  a  signal  every  time  either 
shoe  goes  over  a  ramp.  This  audible  signal  has 
been  found  to  be  a  desirable  auxiliary  for  service 
in  fogs  and  other  unfavorable  weather  condi- 
tions. The  system  is  described,  in  all  its  details, 
in  the  Railway  Review  of  April  12,  1919. 

The  Casale  system  of  automatic  train  control 
has  been  installed,  for  regular  service,  on  21 
miles  of  double  track  of  the  Chicago,  Rock  Island 
&  Pacific  Ry.,  between  Blue  Island  and  Joliet,  111. 
It  is  of  the  intermittent  electrical  contact  type, 
with  automatic  stop  and  speed  control  features. 
The  centrifugal  type  governor  for  the  latter  is 
rigidly  bolted  to  the  outside  of  an  engine  truck 
wheel,  and  securely  enclosed,  so  the  operation  of 
it  is  not  dependent  upon  belt  or  gearing.  The 
method  of  operation  prevents  exceeding  a  desig- 
nated speed  after  receiving  an  automatic  brake 
application  at  the  approach  signal.  A  three-posi- 
tion relay,  in  accordance  with  the  polarity  of 
current  on  the  ramp,  controls  the  train  apparatus 
to  provide  proceed,  caution  or  stop  indications. 


56 


REQUISITES  OF  INSTALLATION. 

Some  of  those  opposed  to  the  idea  of  auto- 
matic train  control  early  sought  to  obstruct  the 
practical  development  of  it  by  demanding,  at  the 
beginning,  a  system  that  would  fulfill  every  con- 
ceivable exigency,  no  matter  how  complicated  or 
unusual  the  situation  might  be.  The  realm  of 
imagination  was  ransacked  to  the  extent  of  quite 
overreaching  practical  requirements,  and  no  dis- 
tinction was  drawn  between  essentials  and  pos- 
sible adjuncts.  In  time,  however,  the  various 
questions  and  differences  were  threshed  out  in 
the  Railway  Signal  Association,  with  the  result 
that  a  set  of  requisites,  stripped  of  superfluous 
exactions,  was  evolved  and  adopted. 

The  requisites  of  installation  of  automatic 
train  control,  formulated  by  the  Railway  Signal 
Association,  after  careful  study  and  several  revi- 
sions, were  adopted  by  the  American  Railway 
Association,  and  later  by  the  United  States  Rail- 
road Administration.  They  are  now  the  recog- 
nized standard  of  practice  in  this  country,  and 
are  as  follows: 

1.  The  apparatus  so  constructed  as  to  operate  in 
connection  with  a  system  of  fixed  block  or  interlock- 
ing signals,  and  so  interconnected  with  the  fixed  sig- 
nal system  as  to  perform  its  intended  functions : 

(a)  In  event  of  failure  of  the  engineman  to  obey  the 
fixed  signal  indications;  and, 

(b)  So  far  as  possible  when  the  fixed  signal  fails 
to  indicate  a  condition  requiring  an  application 
of  the  brakes. 

2.  The  apparatus  so  constructed  that  it  will  per- 
form its  intended  function  if  an  essential  part  fails  or 

57 


is  removed;  or  a  break,  cross,  ground  or  failure   of 
energy  occurs  in  electric  circuits,  when  used. 

3.  The  apparatus  so  constructed  as  to  make  indica- 
tions of  the  fixed  signal  depend  upon  the  operation  of 
the  track  element  of  the  train  control  device. 

4.  The  apparatus  so  constructed  that  proper  opera- 
tive relation  between  those  parts  along  the  roadway 
and  those  on  the  train  will  be  assured  under  all  condi- 
tions of  speed,  weather,  wear,  oscillation  and  shock. 

5.  The  apparatus  so  constructed  as  to  prevent  the 
release  of  the  brakes  after  automatic  application,  until 
the  train  has  been  brought  to  a  stop,  or  its  speed  has 
been  reduced  to  a  predetermined  rate  or  the  obstruc- 
tion or  other  condition  that  caused  the  brake  applica- 
tion has  been  removed. 

6.  The  train  apparatus  so  constructed  that,  when 
operated,  it  will  make  an  application  of  the  brakes 
sufficient  to  stop  the  train  or  control  its  speed. 

7.  The  apparatus  so  constructed  as  not  to  interfere 
with  the  application  of  the  brakes  by  the  engineman's 
brake  valve  or  to  impair  the  efficiency  of  the  air  brake. 

8.  The  apparatus   so  constructed  that  it  may,  be 
applied  so  as  to  be  operative  when  the  engine  is  run-, 
ning  forward  or  backward. 

9.  The  apparatus  so  constructed  that  when  two  or 
more  engines  are  coupled  together  or  a  pusher  is  used 
it  can  be  made  operative  only  on  the  engine  from 
which  the  brakes  are  controlled. 

10.  The    apparatus    so    constructed    that    it    will 
operate  under  all   weather   conditions   which   permit 
train  movements. 

11.  The  apparatus  so  constructed  as  to  conform  to 
established  clearances  for  equipment  and  structures. 

12.  The  apparatus  so  constructed  and  installed  that 
it  will  not  constitute  a  source  of  danger  to  trainmen, 
other  employees,  or  passengers. 


58 


A  GENERAL  VIEW. 

The  most  approved  systems  of  block  signals 
alone  do  not  adequately  protect  trains  against 
collision.  I  am  not  aware  that  any  will  presume 
to  dispute  this,  but  if  some  one  should  the  facts 
are  against  him;  and  facts  can  not  be  argued 
away,  or  even  changed.  The  facts  in  this  case 
are  so  well  established  and  so  open  to  public 
knowledge  as  to  have  been  the  occasion  for  force- 
ful appeals  to  Congress  for  remedial  legislation. 
While  the  foregoing  review  of  the  progress  of 
experiments  with  automatic  train  control  has 
shown  that  these  experiments  have  been  few, 
relatively  speaking,  in  view  of  the  railway  mile- 
age and  traffic  volume  of  the  country,  yet  these 
trials,  under  service  conditions,  let  it  be  under- 
stood, date  back  nearly  thirty  years  for  elevated 
railways  and  full  twenty  years  with  surface 
steam  railroads.  So  little  encouragement  has 
been  given  to  the  promotion  of  automatic  train 
control  by  railway  managements,  even  when 
prompted  by  the  Government,  that  most  of  the 
studies  on  the  question  have  been  initiated  and 
carried  on  by  men  outside  of  railway  service. 
Likewise,  by  far  the  larger  part  of  the  expense 
of  installation  and  tests  has  been  borne  by  private 
enterprise.  As  a  result  of  this,  practically  all  of 
the  score  or  more  of  systems  or  devices  that  are 
now  available  for  practical  tests  are,  at  least  par- 
tially, covered  by  patents;  but  that  situation  is 
not  exceptional  in  the  railway  equipment  field. 

Although,  to  repeat,  the  service  trials  of  auto- 
matic train  control  have  not  been  numerous,  in 

59 


one  way  of  thinking,  yet  in  the  past  two  decades 
there  have  been  enough  of  them,  and  the  degree 
of  success  attained  has  been  sufficient,  to  demon- 
strate that  such  means  of  protection  to  train 
operation  is  both  practicable  and  feasible;  and 
now,  in  spite  of  all  the  contentions,  is  actually  at 
hand.  The  much-studied  requisites  have  all  been 
met,  so  the  last  prop  that  has  held  this  question 
on  debatable  ground  for  many  years  has  been 
knocked  from  under. 

If  it  is  really  necessary  to  refer  to  the  achieve- 
ments of  the  past  few  years  to  support  the  fore- 
going conclusion,  then  an  implication  falls  upon 
the  obstinate  influences  that  have  stood  in  the 
way  of  an  earlier  solution  of  any  of  the  problems 
involved.  As  long  as  eight  years  ago  the  Block 
Signal  and  Train  Control  Board,  after  four 
years  of  investigation  and  service  trials,  summed 
up  its  conclusions  in  the  following  language : 

"Few,  if  any,  of  the  mechanical  or  electrical 
elements  entering  into  the  construction  of  auto- 
matic train-control  systems  involve  any  new 
principles,  nor  are  they  materially  different  from 
the  elements  used  by  the  railroads  in  the  every- 
day operation  of  their  interlocking  and  block 
signals,  train  brakes,  and  other  devices.  The 
ingenuity  and  initiative  which  have  been  mani- 
fested by  railroad  engineers  in  the  development 
of  much  of  the  apparatus  used  in  the  conduct  of 
railroad  business  greatly  exceeds,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  Board,  that  required  to  produce  apparatus 
which  can  be  super-imposed  upon  existing  signal 

60 


systems  adequately  to  compel  obedience  to  the 
signal  indications. 

"Further,  the  Board  has  no  hesitancy  in  say- 
ing that  had  the  railroads  directed  the  same 
effort  toward  the  development  of  automatic 
train-control  apparatus  that  has  been  devoted  to 
the  development  of  interlocking  and  block-signal- 
ing apparatus,  we  should  now  have  adequate 
installations  of  automatic  train-control  devices 
which  would  permit  an  engineman  to  handle  his 
train  without  interference  as  long  as  he  did  it 
properly,  but  would  intervene  to  stop  his  train  if 
he  disregarded  a  stop  signal  or  ran  at  excessive 
speed  where  speed  restriction  was  prescribed." 

The  old  line  of  defense  that  a  practical  sys- 
tem of  automatic  train  control  has  not  been  de- 
veloped no  longer  holds  true,  nor  is  it,  at  this 
day,  even  plausible.  A  few  far-seeing  manage- 
ments, largely  with  the  assistance  of  ingenuity 
from  outside  of  railroad  employees  or  officials, 
having  gone  ahead  and  done  something,  it  is 
now  timely  that  more  initiative  should  proceed 
from  within  the  railroad  corporations.  The 
present  status  of  the  art  will  amply  justify  lay- 
ing out  programs  for  beginning  installation  in 
all  general  situations,  for  circuit  layouts  and  de- 
signs of  apparatus  can  now  be  followed  that  are 
practical  and  safe. 

It  hardly  need  be  added  that  appliances  de- 
veloped fully  to  the  point  of  meeting  every  essen- 
tial condition  of  operation  await  installation 
under  service  conditions,  and  the  more  numer- 
ous and  extensive  the  installations  the  more 

61 


rapid  will  be  the  progress.  The  elaborations  of 
modern  automatic  block  signaling  have  come 
from  small  beginnings,  and  automatic  train  con- 
trol devices  fall  so  nearly  into  the  same  class, 
and  the  solution  of  the  problem  has  progressed 
so  near  to  a  satisfactory  state  that  no  such  rec- 
ord of  "trial  and  error"  as  has  been  true  of  the 
history  of  automatic  block  signaling  need  follow 
from  further  progress  with  train  control. 

It  is  unreasonable  to  expect  that  a  system  of 
train  control,  or  any  other  railroad  equipment 
that  is  equally  intricate,  could  be  thought  out 
full-fledged  and  designed  to  a  finality  in  ad- 
vance of  service  experience.  No  great  improve- 
ment in  railroad  operation  or  railroad  engineer- 
ing has  come  about  in  that  way,  but,  rather,  as 
the  outgrowth  of  trial  and  modification  under 
operating  conditions.  Any  broad-minded  con- 
ception of  the  problem  must  concede  this  truth 
to  be  equally  applicable  to  automatic  train  con- 
trol; and  it  is  now  the  decided  feeling  of  many 
railroad  officials  who  have  looked  into  the  subject 
that  such  automatic  control  is  bound  to  come. 

It  remains  to  be  said  that  the  expense  of  in- 
stallation and  maintenance  is  the  only  real  ques- 
tion which  confronts  the  railroads  in  this  mat- 
ter of  automatic  control  of  trains.  What  the 
first  cost  of  installation  would  be  in  typical  cases, 
not  to  consider  special  situations,  has  not,  for 
lack  of  experience,  been  worked  out  to  close  esti- 
mation, as  yet;  but  it  seems  likely  that  it  might 


62 


reach  a  figure  somewhere  between  $800  and 
$2,000  per  mile  of  road,  according  to  local  con- 
ditions, in  addition  to  the  cost  of  the  wayside 
signals.  At  any  rate  it  is  certain  that  the  cost 
would  not  be  prohibitive. 

In  some  installations  that  have  been  made, 
with  ramps,  and  with  signals  already  installed, 
the  cost  (war-price  basis)  has  been  as  low  as 
$200  per  ramp,  or  $200  per  mile  for  the  track 
appliances.  In  certain  installations  now  in  serv- 
ice the  cost  of  installing  the  appliances  on  the 
locomotives  has  been  around  $600  per  set. 

The  halt  in  railroad  extensions,  and  the  dimin- 
ishing rate  of  improvement  of  existing  lines,  for 
some  years  past,  have  brought  the  transporta- 
tion business  of  the  country  into  a  spell  which 
must  soon  be  broken  if  our  industrial  life  is  to 
prosper.  Much  new  capital  will  be  necessary  to 
provide  for  sorely  needed  second  track,  yard  and 
terminal  additions,  new  buildings  and  other 
facilities.  What  would  be  needed  to  equip  the 
heavy  traffic  lines  for  automatic  train  control 
is  only  a  trifle  compared  with  capital  that  will 
have  to  be  raised  for  the  construction  of  new 
roadbed  and  track.  Now  is  the  time  to  decide 
the  question,  while  the  country,  railroads  and 
all,  is  in  a  state  of  flux.  In  the  years  of  high 
prices  that  seem  bound  to  follow  the  present 
period  of  unrest  the  cost  of  installing  train  con- 
trol, which  must,  in  the  end,  fall  upon  the  "ulti- 
mate consumer,"  will  seem  less  of  a  burden  than 
to  try  to  add  it  on  after  rates  shall  once  more 
become  stabilized. 

63 


What  is  now  needed  in  the  automatic  train 
control  situation  is  to  make  some  kind  of  a  start, 
with  the  most  promising  types  or  systems,  be- 
ginning with  train-stopping  devices  as  the  foun- 
dation, aim  at  gradual  development,  adding  speed 
control  features  and  such  other  refinements, 
step  by  step,  as  may  be  studied  out.  By  the  time 
that  experience  with  the  ordinary  situations  shall 
have  become  general  the  more  difficult  of  the 
problems  relating  to  terminal  conditions  will 
doubtless  have  been  worked  out.  The  fact  is 
that  the  majority  of  serious  train  collisions  have 
not  occurred  where  the  track  conditions  were 
complicated  with  interlocking,  or  with  switches 
and  crossings  and  crossovers,  but  out  on  the 
straight-away  line,  at  a  distance  from  terminals, 
where  high  speed  is  usually  made,  and  where 
enginemen,  as  a  rule,  are  not  as  alert  as  when 
passing  through  terminals.  It  is  therefore  en- 
tirely logical  and  fitting  to  take  the  simplest  sit- 
uations first. 


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